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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court has given itself the opportunity to make
major pronouncements about the taking and just compensation provisions of the fifth amendment in 1987. 1 Three cases involving different
aspects of the taking issue have appeared before the court this Term.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 2 the
Court recently rejected a facial challenge to a Pennsylvania statute
which requires coal mining companies to leave large quantities of coal
in the ground in order to support overlying land. 3 The Court held that
the statute was not invalid as a taking of property without compensation. The case, in many ways, was a replay of the Supreme Court's
1. For the author's earlier views on these issues, see Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on the
White River junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on just Compensation
for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 685 (1986); Berger, Anarchy Reigns
Supreme, 29 ]. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 39 (1985); Berger, The State's Police Power Is Not (Yet)
The Power of a Police State: A Reply to Professor Girard, 35 LAND UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. 4
(May 1983); Berger, To Regulate, or Not to Regulate- Is That the Question? Reflections on the
Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 LoY.
L.A.L. REV. 253 (1975).
2. 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1987)(No. 85-1092).
3. Pennsylvania law recognizes three distinct estates in land: the surface, the mineral, and the
right of surface support, e.g., Captline v. County of Allegheny, 74 Pa. Comm. 85, 459 A.2d 1298,
1301 (1983), each of which may be separately owned, e.g., Charnetski v. Miners Mills Coal
Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 463, 113 A. 683, (1921). The coal companies in the Keystone case had
purchased both the mineral estate and the support estate from the surface owners or their predecessors. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. Debenedictis, 55
U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1987)(No. 85-1092).
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seminal decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 4 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 11 the issue, (which the Court has been unable to decide on four previous occasions6), is whether a property owner whose property is alleged to be
rendered useless by a land use regulation is entitled to just compensation. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 7 the issue is
whether a condition attached to the issuance of a land use permit is
invalid if it bears no rational relationship to problems created by the
proposed use of the property.
The related issues in these cases cover a broad spectrum 8 and give
the Court an unprecedented opportunity to make a comprehensive
statement on the regulatory taking issue.
4. 260

u.s.

393 (1922).

5. No. 85-1199 (U.S. argued Jan. 14, 1987).
6. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson
County Reg. Plan. Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
7. No. 86-133 (U.S. argued March 30, 1987).
8. The Court has also granted plenary review in three other cases which touch on the takings
issue to a greater or lesser extent. Three have already been decided. On February 25, 1987, the
Court decided FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 55 U.S.L.W. 4236 (U.S. Feb. 25, t987)(No. 851658). At the circuit court level, the case had been treated as a replay of Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The lower court reasoned that the two cases were
identical because the FCC determined the rate which utilities could charge cable TV companies to
attach cables to their poles. See Florida Power Corp. v. FCC, 771 F.2d 1537 (It Cir. 1985). The
Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, held that the two cases were not alike. Florida Power was
distinguished from Loretto on the ground that since the utility companies in Florida Power were
not required to accept the cables, there was no taking.
On March 31, 1987, the Court decided United States v. Cherokee Nation, 55 U.S.L.W. 4403
(U.S. Mar. 31, 1987)(No. 85-1940). Applying law uniquely designed for cases involving the socalled paramount navigational servitude of the United States, the Court concluded that no taking
occurred when the government engaged in acts to improve navigation on the Arkansas River,
which passes through the Cherokee reservation in Oklahoma, even though the Cherokee Nation
owned fee title to the river bed.
On May 18, 1987, the Court decided Hodel v. Irving,_ U.S._, 55 U.S.L.W. -·The
case nominally holds, unanimously, that legislation which cut off the inheritability of small Indian
estates was unconstitutional. However, while all nine of the Justices agreed on the "bottom line,"
the judicial line-up was somewhat chaotic: all eight of the other Justices who concurred in Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court, signed one of three separate concurring opinions. Most intriguing for Court watchers is the apparent liberal/conservative dispute over the meaning and continuing vitality of Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Andrus refused to award compensation for
the effects of a statute which prohibited the sale of eagle feathers. It is an opinion which is often
cited by regulators whose actions destroy the value of property while leaving ownership unchanged. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun said they joined the Hodel opinion because it
does not limit Andrus. On the other hand, Justices Scalia and Powell and the Chief Justice said
they joined the Hodel opinion because its logic must limit Andrus. Stay tuned folks. There will be
plenty of taking issue litigation in the future.
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THE PROBLEM

Simply stated, the root of the increasing taking litigation is the
desire by federal, state, and local government agencies to accomplish
two inconsistent goals: regulate more and spend less. The governmental
solution to the dilemma, highlighted in widely varying ways by the
three taking cases which have appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court
in the October 1986 term, is to have someone other than the government pick up the tab.
In Keystone, the State of Pennsylvania wanted to provide security
from surface subsidence even though the owners of the surface (or their
predecessors) had sold their right to that security to coal mining companies. The coal companies owned the support estate as well as the mineral rights. The State's solution to the subsidence problem was to enact
a statute requiring the coal companies to leave enough coal in the
ground to support the surface.
In Lutheran Church, the County of Los Angeles wanted to keep a
substantial amount of land surrounding a natural drainage channel free
of structures so that the channel could smoothly collect surface waters
and convey them to a County reservoir. The County's solution was to
declare the area surrounding the channel a flood hazard and to prohibit
owners of the land from building on it.
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission wanted to create a
public right of way along a privately owned beach. The Coastal Commission's solution was to require, as a condition to any development
permit, the "donation" by the property owners of a public easement
over the beach front of their property.
In each case, the government agency performed what it viewed as
a public service. In each case, the cost of achieving the public good fell
upon the specific property owners.

III.

THE STATE OF THE LAW

The proper legal solution to the above cases varies among current
legal authorities. Some authorities firmly believe that government's
power is virtually unlimited. Those who agree that there are limits,
disagree markedly on the appropriate remedy to apply when government oversteps the boundary. 9 The differences range from the philo9. For direct clashes on these issues, compare, e.g., Girard, Constitutional "Takings
Clauses" and the Regulation of Private Land Use, 34 LAND UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. No. 10 at 4
and No. 11 at 4 (November 1982) with Berger, The State's Police Power is Not (Yet) The Power of
a Police State: A Reply to Professor Girard, 35 LAND UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. No.5 at 4 (1983);
and compare Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193 (1984) with Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on the White River junction

261]

YEAR OF THE TAKING

265

sophical to the practical. In order to better understand the underlying
issues involved in the current Supreme Court cases, the following overview is provided to highlight the arguments for and against the payment of compensation for alleged regulatory takings of private
property.

A.

The "Metaphorical" Taking
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 10 is, in many ways, the foun-

tainhead of taking jurisprudence. 11 It was there that Justice Holmes,
writing for a majority of eight, announced that a regulation which goes
"too far" is a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 12 And
there matters lay for half a century. Then, in order to protect New
York City from the consequences of its own actions (leading to potential bankruptcy), the New York Court of Appeals (through Chief
Judge Breitel) opined that the use of the word "taking" in Pennsylvania Coal was not to be read literally, but metaphorically. 13 The California Supreme Court latched onto this concept, 14 as did several
commentators. 111
The metaphorical taking theory was that a regulation which goes
"too far" is not really a taking; rather it is invalid. The theory
presumes that Pennsylvania Coal merely used the shorthand description "taking" to denote that governmental action could not be upheld
without compensation. Thus, if a government did not offer compensaManifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on just Compensation for Regulatory Taking
of Property, 19 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 685 (1986).
10. 260 u.s. 393 (1922).
11. The case is cited in virtually every U.S. Supreme Court decision dealing with fifth
amendment property rights since 1922. E.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,
106 S. Ct. 2561,2566 (1986); Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 180 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174
(1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
12. 260 U.S. at 415.
13. Fred F. French lnv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (1976). For further discussion of the economic sleight-of-hand thus practiced, see Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River junction Manifesto: A Reply to the
"Gang of Five's" Views on just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 Lov.
L.A.L. REV. 685, 726, n. 185 (1986); Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of
Uncertainty, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZoNING, AND EMINENT DoMAIN 177, 193, n. 50 (S.W.
Legal Foundation 1980).
14. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 274, 598 P.2d 25, 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
376 (1979), a.ffd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
15. E.g., Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193, 210 (1984).
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tion and a court subsequently found the underlying statute or regulation to go "too far," the court could invalidate the statute but could not
require that compensation be paid.
This theory has not survived. Nothing in either Pennsylvania
Coal or any U.S. Supreme Court decision following it gave any hint
that Justice Holmes and the seven other members of the Pennsylvania
Coal majority meant other than what they said. In recent years, a clear
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the "metaphor"
idea. 16

B.

Is the just Compensation Clause "Self-Executing"?

The fifth amendment 17 states, in simple terms, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." 18 Recently, a philosophical dispute has arisen over the question whether just
compensation is a condition precedent to a taking or a condition subsequent. Those who urge the former argue that a taking cannot occur
unless just compensation is paid. Thus, the argument goes, if a governmental activity occurs which would have the effect of taking property,
but no compensation is provided, the condition precedent to taking has
not been met and (by definition) there has not been a taking. Instead,
the action is invalid. Those who hold the contrary view (including the
author of this article), believe that when government activities take private property, compensation must be paid, regardless of the time or
mode of payment.
The most forceful argument in favor of the condition precedent
position was made recently by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae
brief in the Lutheran Church case.

1.

The condition precedent argument

The argument begins with the text of the fifth amendment, which,
on its face, is said to be merely prohibitory. It forbids certain governmental action unless a condition (i.e., compensation) is met. "Thus, the
16. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and Powell, J.); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, Powell,
and Marshall j.).
17. The just compensation guarantee of the fifth amendment was long ago held to be incorporated into the due process guarantee of the 14th amendment, making it applicable to state and
local government agencies. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Indeed, it
was the first part of the Bill of Rights to be so incorporated. Walz v. Tax Commn. 397 U.S. 664,
701-72 (1970). Thus, even though the cases before the U.S. Supreme Court this Term deal with
state and local government agencies, the operative language is that of the fifth amendment.
18. U.S. CoNST., amend. V.
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Clause imposes a limitation on the exercise of power by the government
of the United States. It does not address the question of the appropriate
remedy when the government has exceeded that limitation, except, perhaps, by implication that courts will not tolerate a continuing violation."19 This same interpretation is said to apply to all the clauses of
the fifth amendment, none of which (according to the Solicitor General)
has been interpreted as requiring a compensatory remedy. 20
Three items are said to indicate the intent of the fifth amendment's draftsmen that "there is no self-effectuating damages remedy." 21
First, the United States is immune from suit without explicit congressional waiver. 22 Second, the Constitution bars a court from ordering
payment from the federal treasury without express Congressional authorization.23 Third, when a citizen is deprived of liberty without due
process of law, his remedy is habeas corpus, not damages. By parity of
reasoning, when a citizen is deprived of property without compensation, his remedy should be injunctive relief.2 4
Finally, the Solicitor General collected nineteenth century decisions of state courts 211 and the U.S. Supreme Court26 which held that an
19. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, No. 85-1199 (U.S. argued Jan. 14, 1987).
20. Jd. at 15-16. As noted later, text accompanying notes 26-30, infra, this assertion is simply erroneous. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
21. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Lutheran Church.
22. Citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986); California v. Arizona, 440
U.S. 59 (1979); and Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907).
23. Citing U.S. CaNST., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, and Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272
(1850).
24. Citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. 337 U.S. 682 (1949) and United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). In Larson, the Court was outspoken in its preference for
compensation rather than invalidation:
[I]t is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen may be compensated for a
wrong done to him by the Government. It is a far different matter to permit a court to
exercise its compulsive powers to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it
to act. There are the strongest reasons of public policy for the rule that such relief
cannot be had against the sovereign. The Government, as representative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract right. As was early recognized, the interference
of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments
of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief.
Larson, 337 U.S. at 704. (Emphasis added).
In Lee, the plaintiff sought only possession. Just compensation was not raised as an issue by
any party.
25. Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198 (1853); Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (1851); Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418 (1823); Petition of Mount Washington Rd. Co., 35 N.H. 134
(1857); Picatagua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 35 (1834); Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17
N.J.L. 129 (1839); Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. Rep. 103 (N.Y. 1822).
26. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Searl v. School Dist., 133
U.S. 553 (1890); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895); Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
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attempted taking without compensation would be void and concluded
that invalidation, rather than compensation, was the proper remedy.

2.

The invalidity of the condition precedent approach

The following arguments challenge the Solicitor General's assertion that compensation is a condition precedent to fifth amendment takings: 1) the text of the fifth amendment plainly indicates that compensation shall be paid for governmental takings of private property; 2)
governments are not immune from suit for constitutional violation; 3)
the argument that the takings clause does not require monetary compensation because none of the other clauses in the fifth amendment require it is based on a faulty premise; and 4) early cases which held that
just compensation is a condition precedent do not control present day
takings cases.
a. The text of the fifth amendment. Nothing put forth by the supporters of the condition precedent argument is sufficient to gainsay the
common sense notion that, when the fifth amendment says that, property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, it
plainly means that when property has in fact been taken, compensation
is due. 117
Takings occur before the filing of the suit. 118 In our American litigational system, the rendering of an advisory opinion before the existence of an actual case or controversy is generally prohibited. Thus, by
definition, a taking-i.e., depriving the property owner of reasonable
and economically viable use of his property-has already taken place,
at least for a temporary period. If the words of the just compensation
clause are to be given meaning, compensation must be paid when a
taking is on-going or has already occurred.
Peters) 243 (1833).
27. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the fifth amendment does not require payment in advance of the taking, but merely requires a mechanism (such as inverse condemnation) to
assure that compensation is paid. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). If that is so, just compensation is not a condition precedent
to a taking. Plainly, the Court has treated it as a condition which may be satisfied subsequently.
28. Issues could arise as to the precise date when the taking occurred. Does the taking occur,
for example, when the ordinance or regulation is first introduced, or finally adopted, or on some
other statutory effective date, or does the taking occur when the property owner seeks to use the
property and is turned down? Which of these dates (or others) is applicable may depend on the
facts of the case. There is no reason why the date of a regulatory taking should be treated as other
than a fact question, as it is in physical taking cases. E.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S.
745, 748-49 (1947). For a discussion of the timing problem and suggestions for reciprocal duties of
notice required of property owners (that a taking is occurring) and government regulators (to
specify what uses will be permitted), see KAYDEN, When Is a Regulatory Taking Effective: The
Timing Issue, Monograph no._, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND PoLICY (forthcoming 1987).
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Moreover, the Solicitor General's assertion that other clauses of
the fifth amendment have not been held to give rise to a self-effectuating compensatory remedy is incorrect. In Davis v. Passman, 29 the
gravemen of the cause of action was that Mrs. Davis had been fired by
Congressman Passman because she was a woman. This was a violation
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee which is
safeguarded for federal purposes by the fifth amendment's due process
clause. 30 The Court concluded that the issue was plainly justiciable:
[W]e presume that justiciable constitutional rights are to be enforced
through the courts. And, unless such rights are to become merely
precatory, the class of those litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no
effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must
be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights. 31
The Court then held that not only was a cause of action stated for
purposes of a fifth amendment violation, but that "(Mrs. Davis'] injury
may be redressed by a damages remedy." 32
Thus, the obverse of the Solicitor General's analysis seems in order: if monetary compensation is an appropriate remedy for the violation of a clause of the fifth amendment which merely guarantees due
process, compensation must be an appropriate remedy for a clause of
the fifth amendment which guarantees compensation.
b. Immunity from suit without congressional waiver. While it is
generally true that the Supreme Court has held the United States immune from suit without the express consent of Congress, 33 there is an
important limitation on that immunity: the Constitution. The Supreme
Court most recently considered this issue in Library of Congress v.
Shaw. 34 There, the question was whether Congress' consent to liability
for attorney's fees in employment cases311 also granted jurisdiction to
award interest to compensate for a delay in payment. The Court concluded that it did not, as there was no express mention of interest in the
statute. However, in so ruling the Court was careful to distinguish statutory causes of action from constitutional ones: "Apart from constitutional requirement, in the absence of specific provision by contract or
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

442 U.S. 228 (1979).

/d. at 234.
/d. at 242.
/d. at 249.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 22.
106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).

270

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 1

statute, or 'express consent . . . by Congress,' interest does not run on
a claim against the United States." 36
What the Court meant by "(a]part from constitutional requirement" was made clear in a footnote: "The 'constitutional requirement'
arises in a taking under the Fifth Amendment. To satisfy the constitutional mandate, 'just compensation' includes a payment for interest." 37
Indeed, in suits arising under the Constitution, the Court has
transposed the formulation of the rule regarding congressional action.
Whereas, with statutory rights, the rule is no liability without congressional approval; with constitutional rights, the rule is no immunity
without congressional prohibition-and the prohibition must be accompanied by congressional provision of an alternate and equally effective
remedy. 38 Congressional action or inaction cannot impede the protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 39
c. The propriety of injunctive relief This argument is premised on
the supposition that none of the other clauses of the fifth amendment
have been held to require a compensatory remedy. Because the remedies for deprivations of liberty and due process are essentially injunctive
in nature, parity of reasoning is said to require the same sort of relief
for regulatory takings.
However, as noted earlier, the premise of this argument is erroneous. Deprivation of due process has been held to require a compensatory remedy.' 0 Without its premise, the argument fails.
d. The nineteenth century cases. This argument relies on early
decisions in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Georgia, Arkansas, New Hampshire and the U.S. Supreme Court. 41 The cases in effect held that an attempted taking of property without compensation is
void because compensation is a condition precedent to taking property.
There are two responses to this argument.
First, in none of those cases was compensation sought by the property owner. This is not an insignificant fact. Courts tend to deal with
the issues presented to them, rather than roaming afield in order to
36. 106 S. Ct. 2957, 2963; (emphasis added) (quoting with approval United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253, 264-265 (1980)).
37. Id. at 2963, n. 5 (citations omitted).
38. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979).
39. The same analysis would seem to apply to the argument that only Congress can appropriate funds. If the Constitution requires the payment of compensation for a taking, then Congress
cannot prevent it. Moreover, the supposedly exclusive appropriation power of Congress was no
barrier to Constitutional damage actions in Bivens, note 38 supra, and Davis, note 38 supra. It
can be no more of a barrier in property cases.
40. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
41. See notes 25-26, supra.
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decide issues not raised. These cases were decided at a point in our
history when at least three factors were substantially different (from a
regulatory viewpoint) than they are now:
(1) if land use permits were required, one permit was generally all that was needed;
(2) litigation was swift; and
(3) land was plentiful.
Thus, if there was any question about one's ability to make profitable use of his land, it was a question which could be answered quickly
and cheaply. If the property owner didn't like the answer, he could
simply heed Horace Greely's advice to follow the sun.
It is obvious that many things have changed with the passage of
time. 42 If nothing, else, the proliferation of permit wielding agencies
with overlapping authority has created what two noted commentators
call "a synergistic nightmare, a paralyzing mishmash" whose result is a
"bubbling cacophony of multitudinous edicts." 43 Merely working one's
way through this jungle may consume more time and effort than the
ordinary mortal can manage." The prospect of litigation after "exhausting" (in more ways than one) the administrative avenues is less
than appetizing, as all that can be assured is more years of conflict and
turmoil. 46
42. The adaptability of the law to changing times has long been established. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326, 4331 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1987)(No.
85-1092); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
For more extensive discussion and citations regarding land use, see Berger & Kanner,
Thoughts on The White River junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on just
Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 685, 696-703 (1986).
43. Hagman & Misczynski, The Quiet Federalization of Land Use Controls: Disquietude in
the Land Markets, 40 THE REAL EsTATE APPRAISER 5, 7 (1974).
44. Note the following observation:
City planners also act irresponsibly, if not unethically, when they recommend legislation or base city planning decisions on ordinances which they favor, but which they
know will likely be overturned if appealed to the courts. It is not uncommon for city
and county planners, with characteristic certainty that their ends justify the means, to
take advantage of the fact that it is almost always too time-consuming and expensive for
private land developers to challenge laws and administrative decisions in court, even if
they are of dubious legality.
Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42 Pus. ADMIN. REV. 1, 4 (1982).
45. As noted in one recent case:
The suit has already outlived the original plaintiff, Paul Kollsman. The Kollsman
estate will be most fortunate indeed if it is able to resolve even the simple and unimportant state law aspect of this litigation by 1987 -ten years after the time the original
application was filed. The case will then return to the federal courts for resolution of
the federal issues unless by that time the plaintiffs have abandoned their rights in
despair.
Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830, 844 (9th Cir. 1984) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting),
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Thus, the relevance of cases based on facts arising at a time so far
removed and under circumstances so radically different seems scant. All
that can be learned from those cases is that nineteenth century property
owners were satisfied with specific relief and the courts were willing to
provide it.
Second, the cited jurisdictions (along with many others) have issued more recent decisions holding that when a taking occurs, just compensation is constitutionally mandated. Take the U.S. Supreme Court
as an example. After purportedly reviewing all of the Court's just compensation cases, the Solicitor General concluded: "In no case has this
Court ever expressly held that the Fifth Amendment, standing alone
and without further congressional action, mandates a damage remedy
against the United States." 46
The Solicitor General's opinion, however, does not take account of
the Court's 1933 decision in Jacobs v. United States. 47 In that case the
Court plainly held:
The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for
property taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of
its power of eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted
and the right was asserted in suits by the Owners did not change the
essential nature of the claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify
the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition
was not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the
Amendment. 48

The Supreme Court plainly said in a later opinion that Jacobs
"held that a plaintiff who alleged that his property had been taken by
the United States for public use without just compensation could bring
suit directly under the Fifth Amendment." 49
The Solicitor General evaded the plain meaning of Jacobs by arguing that Jacobs (and similar cases) were brought under the jurisdiction granted by the Tucker Act 50 and thus did not arise directly under
the fifth amendment but under a statute enacted by Congress. However, this argument was rejected by the Supreme Court four decades
ago:
cert. denied iOS S. Ct. 1179 (1985).
46. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21, Lutheran Church.
47. 290 u.s. 13 (1933).
48. /d. at 16 (Emphasis added.).
49. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242, n. 20 (1979).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1491. The Tucker Act vests the Claims Court with jurisdiction over cases
against the United States based on the Constitution or contract.
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But whether the theory . . . be that there was a taking under the
Fifth Amendment, and that therefore the Tucker Act be invoked because it is a claim founded upon the Constitution, or that there was
an implied promise by the Government to pay for it, is immaterial. In
either event, the claim traces back to the prohibition of the Fifth

Amendment, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' The Constitution is intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories. 61

That common sense conclusion has neither been questioned nor
abandoned by the Court. It is thus clear that, in its twentieth century
cases, the Supreme Court has adapted its view to the reality of the
times. 112

C. If There is a Remedy Under the Civil Rights Act, Does That Preclude a Constitutional Remedy?
Another argument which has been raised in opposition to applying
a compensatory remedy directly under the Constitution is that in cases
against local government agencies (by far the largest number of regulatory taking cases), the fourteenth amendment's incorporation of the
fifth amendment's just compensation guarantee is said to be enforceable
only by Congress, not by the courts. 113
1.

The basic premise

The basic premise for this argument is that Congress is the branch
of government which is empowered to enforce the fourteenth amendment, rather than the judiciary. A number of Supreme Court cases are
cited in support of this proposition. Their essence is that the primary
purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to augment the power of
Congress to enforce the goals of equal protection and due process. 114
Also said to support this premise is the Supreme Court's "reluctan[ce]
51. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
52. For cases more recent than the state court decisions relied on by the Solicitor General in
Lutheran Church, see J.W. Black Lumber Co., Inc. v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control &
Ecology, 290 Ark. 170, 717 S.W.2d 807 (1986); Clifton v. Berry, 244 Ga. 78, 259 S.E.2d 35
(1979); Hamilton v. Conservation Comm., 425 N.E.2d 358 (Mass. App. 1981); Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 184 N.J. Super. II, 445 A.2d 46 (1982).
53. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27, Lutheran Church. Section five of the
14th amendment gives Congress the power to enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment.
54. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653-56 (1966); Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 678-80 (1966) (Black J., dissenting); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 783 n. 4 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879); The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
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to permit a cause of action in federal court directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, unaided by congressional legislation." 1111

2.

The basic premise is flawed

The problems with the basic premise are manifold. First, accepting the cited cases at their face value, the most that they hold is that
the primary purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to augment the
power of Congress. There is no reason given which would preclude
courts from exercising their normal function of enforcing express constitutional provisions. 116
Second, with respect to the rights actually guaranteed by the plain
words of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court said shortly
after adoption of that amendment that its terms were "selfexecuting. " 117
Third, as a matter of public policy, the premise lacks a logical
basis. If the courts cannot enforce the amendment without express congressional action, one is left with the ludicrous proposition that the
framers of the fourteenth amendment intended its substantive terms to
be horatory statements which Congress could enliven or repeal. Aside
from the obvious fact that the drafters and ratifiers of the triumvirate of
post-Civil War amendments intended them to have clear impact, the
idea that Congress can control the effect given by the judiciary to the
Constitution has been moribund at least since Marbury v. Madison. 118
Building directly on the foundations laid by Chief Justice Marshall and James Madison, the Supreme Court recently summed up its
philosophy:
The Constitution, on the other hand, does not partake of the prolixity of a legal code.' McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 407 L
Ed 579 (1819). It speaks instead with a majestic simplicity. One of its
important objects,' ibid., is the designation of rights. And in its great
outlines,' ibid., the judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary
55. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 30, Lutheran Church (citing Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398-400 (1979); Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1977); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 4 n. 3
(1976)). These cases are not as clear as the Solicitor General implies. The only "reluctance" I see
in them is a reluctance to rule on issues either not raised in the lower courts or not preserved for
Supreme Court review.
56. Indeed, in one of the cases relied on by the Solicitor General, the Court made this express: "[W]e may safely leave that matter until Congress shall have exercised its power, or some
case of state oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed a decision at
our hands." The Slaughter House cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872). (Emphasis added).
57. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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means through which these rights may be enforced. As James
Madison stated when he presented the Bill of Rights to the Congress:
'If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the Legislature or Executive;
they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of
rights.' I Annals of Congress 439 ( 1789).
At least in the absence of 'a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department,' we
presume that justicible constitutional rights are to be enforced through
the courts. And, unless such rights are to become merely precatory,
the class of those litigants who allege that their own constitutional
rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective
means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to
invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their
right. 'The very essence of civil liberty,' wrote Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L Ed 60
(1803), 'certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the law, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection.' Traditionally, therefore, 'it is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction
of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by
the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing
what the 14th Amendment forbids the State to do.' 59

The Court lias also made it clear that this theory is not limited to
injunctive relief. In a case dealing with unreasonable searches and
seizures under the fourth amendment, the Court responded to the government's argument that monetary damages could not be awarded for a
fourth amendment violation:
That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem
a surprising proposition. Historically, damages have been regarded as
the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.
Of course the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide
for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. But 'it is ... well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done.' 80
59. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979)(some citations omitted).
60. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971)(citations
omitted).
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Clearly, the Supreme Court treats constitutional provisions as judicially enforceable. 61
Finally, the Supreme Court's decisions plainly show that the fourteenth amendment is enforceable notwithstanding the absence of congressional action. Two illustrations should suffice. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 82 the Court was faced with a San Francisco ordinance which
prohibited the maintenance of laundries in wooden buildings without
the express consent of the Board of Supervisors. Most of San Francisco's buildings at that time were made of wood. All applications for
permits by Chinese were denied, while all applications but one by nonChinese were granted. The Court lost little time in concluding that the
actions of San Francisco violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 68
In Brown v. Board of Education, 6 "' the Court reconsidered the
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson 6 " in the context of
segregated elementary and high schools, and concluded that the doctrine
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 66 No
Congressional enactment lay behind either decision. In each, the fourteenth amendment was directly enforced.

3.

The secondary premise

Building on the flawed basic premise, a secondary premise behind
the argument that only Congress can enforce the fifth amendment takings clause is urged: Because Congress exercised its authority under
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment by enacting 42 U.S.C. section
1983 (the Civil Rights Act), there is no need to imply a remedy directly
under the fourteenth amendment. 67
61. It is one thing to favor benefical land use controls and environmental protection. It
is, however, another matter to categorically deny any compensation to landowners in
the name of the public interest when their land is stripped of its value. This result is
clearly inequitable and constitutionally impermissible. If the phrase 'eminent domain'
has any meaning, that meaning is that property is protected by the judicial branch
against the other branches of state and federal government. Awarding monetary compensation is an integral part of the pattern of protection, as is invalidation of excessive
regulation. At times, however, invalidation provides inadequate protection.
Kratovil, Eminent Domain Revisited and Some Land Use Problems, 34 DE PAUL L. REv. 587,
589 (1985).
62. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
63. ld. at 374.
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
66. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
67. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 31, Lutheran Church.
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The secondary premise is flawed

The secondary premise is contradicted by recent Supreme Court
decisions which have implied compensatory remedies for violations of
various provisions of the Bill of Rights. 68 The key case is Carlson v.
Green, 69 an eighth amendment case based on the infliction of injuries
and failure to provide adequate medical attention to a prisoner who
subsequently died. The issue of the availability of a direct constitutional
cause of action when Congress has provided a statutory remedy was
directly presented by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 70 An action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act was available. Nonetheless, the Court held that unless it
could be clearly shown that Congress intended its statutory remedy to
be exclusive and that the statutory remedy was equally effective, there
was no bar to implying a remedy directly under the Constitution. 71
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act was exhaustively
analyzed in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services. 72 Nothing in that legislative history indicates any intention by Congress to
forbid the availability of a remedy directly under the Constitution to
citizens who are injured by violations of the fourteenth amendment. 73
The judiciary remains free to perform its function of protecting the
rights of individuals against the massed desires of society at large. Governmental status confers power. If wrongly used, much damage can be
inflicted. As the Supreme Court insightfully noted: "[P]ower, once
granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully
used. An agent acting, albeit unconstitutionally, in the name of the
68. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 24 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228 (1979) (fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (fourth amendment);.
69. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
70. /d. at 17 n. 2 and accompanying text.
71. /d. at 18-19. See also, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-247 (1979); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
72. 436 u.s. 658, 665-95 (1978).
73. Quite the contrary. Representative Shellabarger, House Sponsor of the bill, noted that
the courts historically had enforced general prohibitions upon actions of government agencies:
Most of the provisions of the Constitution which restrain and directly relate to the
States, such as those in [Art 1, § 10] relate to the divisions of the political powers of the
State and General Governments
. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of the states are all of such nature
that they can be, and even have been enforced by the courts of the United States declaring void all State acts of encroachment of Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently,
has the United States enforced' these provisions of the Constitution.
Congressional Globe, 42d Congress, 1st Session, Appendix 69-70 (1871) quoted in Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 671 (1978).

278

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 1

United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own." 74

D.

Police Power or Eminent Domain?

When a government regulation is challenged by a property owner
as violating the fifth amendment's just compensation clause, the government's normal first line of defense is to say that it was exercising the
"police" power, not the "eminent domain" power, and thus the just
compensation guarantee does not apply. 711 There are three lines of Supreme Court cases which delineate this battleground.

1.

Old police power cases

The first line of cases involves uses of property which are injurious
to others. This group includes the classic cases of Mugler v. Kansas, 76
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 77 and Reinman v. Little Rock. 78 Plainly, the
ordinances in these cases were upheld because specific uses being made
of the regulated property were found to be injurious to others on other
property. 79 As the Court put it in Mugler, the fountainhead of this line
of cases:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals,
or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a
taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such
legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his
property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but
is only a declaration by the State that its use by anyone, for certain
forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. Nor can
74. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
75. For extended discussion of this issue, see Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White
River junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for
Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 685, 696-703 (1986). While some commentators accept this distinction (e.g., Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White
River junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 209, 211 (1984)), others denigrate it. See, e.g.,
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1186 (1967)("wordplay"); Van Alstyne, Taking
or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria 44 S. CAL. L.
REv. I, 2 (197t)("circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric"); Waite, Governmental Power and
Private Property, 16 CATH. U.L. REv. 283, 292 (1967)("illusory").
76. 123 U.S. 623 (1887)(prohibition of liquor business).
77. 239 U.S. 394 (1915)(prohibition of brickyard in residential neighborhood).
78. 237 U.S. 171 (1915)(prohibition of livery stable in downtown area).
79. See generally, E. FREUND, THE PoLICE PowER § 511 (1904); Berger, To Regulate, or
Not to Regulate - Is That the Question? Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 253, 275-79 (1975); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 39 (1964).
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legislation of that character come within the Fourteenth Amendment,
in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is not to protect
the community, or to promote the general well being but, under the
guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and
property, without due process of law. The power which the States
have of prohibiting such usc by individuals of their property as will
be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is
not, and consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain,
by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community. The exercise of the police
power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its
value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for
public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due
process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the
other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner. 80
Thus, even though one may refrain from attaching moral blameworthiness to property owners or their land uses, if use of property
causes injury to other property owners and the public, that use will be
prohibited. 81 As the premier treatise on eminent domain concludes:
The distinguishing characteristic between eminent domain and the
police power is that the former involves the taking of property because of its need for the public use while the latter involves the regulation of such property to prevent the use thereof in a manner that is
detrimental to the public interest. 82

Curtin v. Benson, 83 another case decided in that same era, makes
it clear that the Mugler line of cases does not grant carte blanche to
government agencies to regulate private property into oblivion. Curtin
states that:
On the merits of the case we may concede, arguendo, as contended by the appellees and disputed by appellant, that the United
States may exercise over the park not only rights of a proprietor, but
the powers of a sovereign. There are limitations, however, upon both.
Neither can be exercised to destroy essential uses of private property.
80. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). (Emphasis added.)
81. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326, 4331 (U.S.
Mar. 9, 1987) (No. 85-1092), the Court confirmed that the Mugler line of cases applies to "activity akin to a public nuisance."
82. I P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 1.42 at 1-127 (3d rev. ed. 1975).
(Emphasis in the text).
83. 222 u.s. 78 (1911 ).
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The right of appellant to pasture his cattle upon his land, and the
right of access to it, are of the very essence of his proprietorship. May
conditions be put upon their exercise such as appellees put upon
them? ... [The government's] order is not ... a regulation of the
use of the land, as an order to fence the lands might be, but is an
absolute prohibition of use. It is not a prevention of a misuse or
illegal use, but the prevention of a legal and essential use,-an attribute of its ownership,-one which goes to make up its essence and
value. To take it away is practically to take his property away, and to
do that is beyond the power even of sovereignty, except by proper
proceedings to that end. 84

Thus, when the prevented use is not injurious to others, the
Mugler line of cases supplies no authority to confiscate without
compensation. 80

2. Recent regulatory taking cases: distinction between ends and
means
A legitimate governmental goal does not legitimize any solution
chosen. Of course, there must be a legitimate goal; otherwise the action
is void. But that is only half of the case. The means chosen to achieve
the goal must be subjected to scrutiny to determine whether they are
constitutional. 86 As pointedly noted in a recent Supreme Court opinion,
"a municipality has no discretion to violate the Federal Constitution; its
dictates are absolute and imperative." 87 The Supreme Court has emphasized the distinction between ends and means repeatedly in recent
cases. 88
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 88 involved a
statute designed to provide apartment dwellers access to cable televison.
Landlords were required to permit cable installation, and one dollar
was the legislatively presumed just compensation for this invasion of
the landlord's premises. The fact that a state's pursuit of a legitimate
84. /d. at 86. (Emphasis added.)
85. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978): "It is, of
course, implicit in Goldblatt [v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (the latest in the Mugler line)]
that a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' ... perhaps if it has an unduly
harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property."
86. See generally SHONKWILER & MoRGAN, LAND USE LITIGATION § 4, 5 (1986).
87. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980).
88. This line of cases also has older antecedents. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown,
276 U.S. 192, 193 (1928) stated: "[A]ssuming ... a proper exertion of the police power, it does
not follow that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment would not safeguard to the owner
just compensation for the use of its property." [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis added.)
89. 458 u.s. 419 (1982).
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goal is not enough to insulate its statute from the reach of the just
compensation clause is shown by the following language from Loretto:
The Court of Appeals determined that § 828 serves the legitimate public purpose of 'rapid development of and maximum penetration by a means of communication which has important educational
and community aspects,' and thus is within the State's police power.
We have no reason to question that determination. It is a separate
question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates
property rights that compensation must be paid. 90

Kaiser Aetna v. United States 91 involved a private marina in Hawaii. After the marina was constructed (by dredging out ancient, shallow fish ponds and cutting an opening to the ocean), the Corps of Engineers ordered the owners to open the marina to the public. The
Supreme Court decreed that this could not be done without
compensation:
In light of its expansive authority under the Commerce Clause,
there is no question but that Congress could assure the public a free
right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina if it so chose. Whether a
statute or regulation that went so far amounted to a taking, however,
is an entirely separate question. 92

United States v. Security Industrial Bank93 dealt with retroactive
application of bankruptcy legislation. Debtors, supported by the United
States as an intervenor, urged that retroactive application was "rational" and thus within the power of Congress. The Supreme Court
disagreed, because of the impact of retroactivity on vested property
rights of the lenders: "[H]owever 'rational' the exercise of the bankruptcy power may be, that iniquiry is quite separate from the question
whether the enactment takes property within the prohibition of the
Fifth Amendment." 94 This discussion could be extended much further,911 but it seems unnecessary to belabor the point. The exercise of a
90. /d. at 425. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
91. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
92. /d. at 174. (Emphasis added; citations and footnote omitted.)
93. 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
94. /d. at 75. (Emphasis added.)
95. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (registration of pesticides);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (settlement of the Carter era Iranian hostage
incident); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (solving massive railroad
bankruptcies). These cases all involved legitimate exercises of Congressional or Executive power to
deal with major problems. In the process, private property rights may have been taken. In each
case, the Court directed the property owners to the Claims Court to determine whether these
legitimate actions required compensation.
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legitimate function does not justify the government's choice of a mechanism which takes private property without compensation.

3.

Are the eminent domain power and the police power separate?

A number of years ago, Professor Beuscher offered the following
conclusion about the "police" power and the "eminent domain" power
being separate: "The inverse condemnation cases should remind us that
those writers who emphasize the separate air tight, non-overlapping
character of the two basic powers, police power and eminent domain,
have been too glib." 98
Professor Beuscher's observation is as pertinent today as it was
when originally written. A third line of Supreme Court cases makes it
clear that the police power and the eminent domain power are not
tightly sealed in vacuums, each untouched by the other. Instead, they
are more properly viewed as overlapping segments on a spectrum of
governmental power. 97 While there are certainly some regulations (at
one end of the spectrum) which do not take private property, there are
others (as the exercise moves further along the spectrum) which involve
the Fifth Amendment's just compensation guarantee. And, indeed, that
seems the clear message of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 98 where
it was held that a police power regulation which goes "too far" is, in
fact, a taking. 99 This interpretation of Pennsylvania Coal seems to be
the current view of the Supreme Court. It has been reaffirmed in at
least five recent regulatory taking cases, most recently, in Keystone.
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank/ 00 the Court said that its inquiry in a regulatory taking case
is designed "to distinguish the point at which regulation becomes so
onerous that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the property
96. Beuscher, Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts:
Inverse Condemnation, in J. BEUSCHER & R. WRIGHT, LAND UsE 724 (1969).
97. See 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 1.42[7] at 1-208 to 1-209 (3rd
rev. ed 1975) ("the police power is but another name for the power of government.") For criticisms of the use of the "police power" label as being only a source of confusion, see Kratovil,
Eminent Domain Revisited and Some Land Use Problems, 34 DE PAULL. REV. 587, 608 (1985);
Linde, Without Due Process, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 147 (1970) (since writing this article, Professor
Linde has become a Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court.)
98. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
99. The Court noted one year before Pennsylvania Coal that "there comes a point at which
the police power ceases and leaves only that of eminent domain." Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135,
156 (1921). See also Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 15,
38 (1983).
100. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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through eminent domain or physical possession." 101 This same formulation was reiterated a year later in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
County of Yolo. 102
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 103 the first of the recent influx of
compensation issue cases considered by the Supreme Court, a taking
was said to occur either if the regulation fails to advance a legitimate
state interest or if it denies the owner economically viable use of his
property. 10• The point was reiterated five years later in United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, /nc./ 0& and again this year in Keystone.106 Under this formulation, a legitimate police power action can
be a taking. The only question is the impact of the regulation on the
property owner. 107
Moreover, in other cases, the Court has emphasized the congruent,
non-segregated nature of the police and eminent domain powers. In
Berman v. Parker 108 the Court upheld the concept of urban renewal.
In so doing, the Court relied on the government's police power as the
source of the ability to beautify inner cities and the just compensation
clause as the protection supplied to property owners affected by the
project. 109 This thirty year old precedent was updated and twice reiterated in 1984 (in the context of both inverseuo and directm condemnation), the Court concluding that the public use requirement in eminent
101. /d. at 199. Judging a taking by its impact on the property owner, rather than the
government's intent or the particular means involved has long been standard takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651-53 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
102. 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986).
103. 447 u.s. 255 (1980).
104. /d. at 260.
105. 106 S. Ct. 455, 459 (1985).
106. Keystone, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4330 (1987).
107. If doubt existed whether noble regulatory goals could override constitutional guarantees,
it should have been dispelled in 1977, when the Court expressed its views quite clearly:
Mass transportation, energy conservation, and environmental protection are goals
that are important and of legitimate public concern. Appellees contend that these goals
are so important that any harm to bondholders from repeal of the 1962 covenant is
greatly outweighed by the public benefit. We do not accept this invitation to engage in
a utilitarian comparison of public benefit and private loss.... Thus, a State cannot
refuse to meet its legitimate financial obligations simply because it would prefer to
spend the money to promote the public good rather than the private welfare of its
creditors.
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1977).
108. 348 u.s. 26 (1954).
109. /d. at 32-33, 36.
110. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984).
111. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
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domain is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."112 This, position was reiterated this year in Keystone. 113
There are not two independent powers. There is only the power of
government. And that power 1s plainly circumscribed by the
Constitution.

E.

California as a Lab Experiment

Apart from the philosophical debates discussed m prevwus
paragraphs is the highly unique approach to regulatory takings embraced by the State of California. It is acknowledged by lawyers and
professors on both sides of the takings issue that California is virtually
in a world of its own, seemingly oblivious to the rights of property
owners. 1 a Scholarly comments on this deference to government range
from mild 1111 to acerbic. 116 The following observation is typical:
The striking feature of California zoning law is that the courts in that
state have quite consistently been far rougher on the property rights
of developers than those in any other state. In a fairly long series of
cases, the California court has upheld restrictions on property rights
which would not be upheld in many other states, and (in some instances) probably not in any other. Moreover, this group of decisions
is not an isolated phenomenon, out of line with the rest; the same
spirit pervades the body of California zoning law generally. 117
112. /d.
113. Keystone, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4332, n. 20 (1987).
114. Land use decisions in California have been based on citations to the works of such
authorities as Malvina Reynolds (Novi v. City of Pacifica, 169 Cal. App. 3d 678, 682, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 439, 441 (1985)) and Ogden Nash (Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848,
186, 610 P.2d 407 (1980), rev'd in part, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)). Res should ipsa loquitur.
115. "The California Courts have long been exceedingly deferential to land use controls
adopted by local governments .... " R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND UsE CoNTROLS 75
(1981).
116. California has always been notorious for being the first jurisdiction to sustain extreme municipal regulations. Practitioners in other states have joked about why a developer would sue a California community when it would cost a lot less and save much
time if he simply slit his throat.
R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZoNING GAME REVISITED 293 (1985).
Please note that the authors of this conclusion are not unsympathetic to government agencies.
See, e.g., their recently co-authored article arguing that compensation for regulatory takings would
be a bad idea. Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984).
117. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§ 6.03 at 115-116 (1974). (Emphasis added.) See also 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§ 151.01 at 276, § 156.07
at 357 (rev. ed. 1985). Other commentators have expressed similar views. Consider the following:
"In the wide spectrum of holdings reached [in land use cases] in other jurisdictions, one of the
more restrictive and extreme applications of the tandem theories [of vested rights and estoppel] has
been the California courts." Kudo, Nukolii: Private Development Rights and the Public Interest,
16 THE URBAN LAWYER 279, 287 (1984). (Emphasis added.)
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In addition to the scholarly commentary on California takings jurisprudence, there is a revealing analysis from within the California
system. An article co-authored by a career research attorney (since
1969) for the California Supreme Court, provides some insight into the
thinking of those who are on that Court. The article notes (in an understatement) that "California law has taken a unique course, rendering decisions of other jurisdictions of little relevance to the California
practitioner." 118 Later in the article, it is revealed that one of those
"other jurisdictions" whose decisions are deemed "of little relevance" is
the Federal judicial system:
[Justice Brennan's] San Diego dissent strongly urged an application of the Holmes
balancing of public need against private loss that more heavily favors the private landowner and focuses on the economic hardship caused by the excessive delay, onerous
controls, and the draconian vested rights rules prevailing in California, where the
case arose.
Indeed, the Brennan San Diego dissent, in both tone and substance, can easily be
read as a reaction against California's strict state and local land use regulations. It also
may take into account the inability of private landowners to obtain any sort of judicial
relief from instances of undue hardship, lengthy procedural delays, and California's
strict vested property rights rules and virtual judicial dismissal of the Holmes opinion
in Pennsylvania Coal.
Callies, The Taking Issue Revisited, 37 LAND UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. 6, 7 Uuly 1985). (Emphasis added.)
[Justice Brennan's San Diego dissent] is a chilling premonition for local government
while a relief to landowners who have often gone wholly without remedy in California
and elsewhere when highly restrictive government regulations have virtually destroyed
land values even when the regulation itself is deemed and is held to be illegal.
Callies, Land Use Controls: An Eclectic Summary for /980-/98/, 13 THE URBAN LAWYER 723,
725 (1981). (Emphasis added.)
All these tests, with the possible exception of those used in California, attempt to
examine the needs of the area being subdivided or the burdens it will place on public
facilities and then determine whether the exaction in some way meets the need or offsets the burden. The California court, while parroting constitutionally required reasonableness, states its rule in no-win language and requires the developer to bear the
burden of proving that there is no reasonable relationship between the dedication requirements and health, safety, and general welfare. Note, however, that this test completely ignores the question of confiscation as though it never arises.
Staples, Exaction - Mandatory Dedications and Payments in Lieu of Dedication, INSTITUTE
ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN Ill, 119 (S.W. Legal Foundation 1980). (Emphasis added.)
[A]nyone who practices public law in California should know better than to expect the
California courts to be sympathetic with procedural due process protests when they
challenge governmental practices.
. . . What can one say about the California courts other than that one has to be a
madman to challenge a government regulation in that bizarre jurisdiction?"
R. Babcock & C. Siemon, THE ZoNING GAME REVISITED 251, 257 (1985) (emphasis in
original).
118. Willemsen & Phillips, Down-Zoning and Exclusionary Zoning in California Law, 31
HASTINGS L. j. 103, 104 (1979).
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In rejecting the remedy of damages for inverse condemnation, California courts have charted a unique course. Their decisions, although
resting on principles of fiscal policy and flexibility in planning, put
California at odds with some of the federal courts, particularly the
Northern District of California. Consequently landowners are likely
to file future inverse condemnation actions in federal instead of state
courts, thus forcing the federal courts to face the question of whether
to follow HFH and Agins [i.e., California law] or to adhere to federal precedents. 111'
As will be noted later in the discussions of Lutheran Church and
Nollan (two of the cases before the Supreme Court this Term), this
California philosophy has emboldened California government agencies
to experiment with far-reaching regulatory actions of all types. They
know that the odds are greatly in favor of the regulations being upheld.
If they are not upheld, the only relief granted is to invalidate the regulation and return the matter to the regulating entity for further proceedings. This sort of wrist slap is no remedy at all. It provides neither
relief to injured property owners nor incentive to constitutional conduct
by regulators.
The extreme nature of what has been happening in California
seems finally to have attracted the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.
This Term could provide a definitive response.

IV.

THE CURRENT CASES

Having discussed some of the common underlying threads in the
takings legal tapestry, it is appropriate to look closer at the three regulatory taking cases which have appeared before the Supreme Court this
Term. For each case, the article gives a detailed factual summary, describes the issues presented and discusses the litigation in the lower
courts and the Supreme Court.

119. /d. at 121. (Emphasis added.). The idea of "forcing" a "choice" between decisions of a
state court and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and other Federal courts on issues of Federal
Constitutional law is preposterous. One would have thought the issue settled no later than
Appomattox.
California's openly rebellious posture is of a type rarely seen in the U.S. Supreme Court
since the demise of the "interposition" doctrine in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958).
This defiance of the Supremacy Clause (U.S. CoNST., art. VI, cl. 2) is reminiscent of the famous
"speech" by the trial judge in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (quoted in the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion, 381 U.S. at 566) in which he proclaimed that his oath was to uphold the state
constitution, rather than the federal.
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Pennsylvania Coal Revisited

Keystone, the first of the three current takings cases to be argued
and decided, presented the Court with the rare opportunity to re-examine a decision handed down many decades ago. For, in substance,
aside from the fact that the statute in Keystone is directed at the mining
of bituminous coal while the statute in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 120
was directed at the mining of anthracite coal, the statutes are the same.
A comparison of the statutes makes this clear:
Pennsylvania Coal

Keystone

[I]t is unlawful for any owner,
operator, director, or general
manager, superintendent, or
other person in charge of, or
having supervision over, any
anthracite coal mine or mining
operation, so to mine anthracite
coal or so to conduct the
operation of mining anthracite
coal as to cause the caving-in,
collapse or subsidence of . . . (d)
Any dwelling or other structure
used as a human habitation .... 121

[N]o owner, operator, lessor,
lessee, or general manager,
superintendent or other person in
charge of or having supervisioin
over any bituminous coal mine
shall mine bituminous coal so as
to cause damage as a result of
the caving-in, collapse or
subsidence of . . . (2) Any
dwelling used for human
habitation .... 122

This parallel should be kept in mind during the following review of the
two cases.
1.

Pennsylvania Coal

While generating much current controversy, 123 the opmwn in
Pennsylvania Coal was short, simple, and direct. Soon after Pennsylva120. 260 u.s. 393 (1922).
121. Brief for Petitioners at 19, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 55
U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1987) (No. 85-1092).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., F. BossELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssuE (1973);
Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RuTGERS L. J. 15 (1983); Blume &
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984);
Damich, Does 14=51 Overregulation and Compensable Taking, 10 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REv.
701 (1980); Kratovil, Eminent Domain Revisited and Some Land Use Problems, 34 DE PAULL.
REV. 587 (1985); Rose, Mahon Reconsidered: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984); Siemon, Of Regulatory Takings and Other Myths, 1 J. LAND UsE &
ENv. L. 105 (1985); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1057 (1980); Wright, Damages or Compensation for Unconstitutional Land Use Regula-
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nia adopted the Kohler Act (quoted above), the Pennsylvania Coal Co.
gave notice to Mr. Mahon that it planned to conduct extensive mining
activities in its coal field beneath his house. Mr. Mahon owned only
the surface of the land. The coal company, under established Pennsylvania law, 124 owned both the mineral estate in the property and the
support estate. Mr. Mahon reacted by filing suit in the Pennsylvania
courts, seeking to enjoin mining operations pursuant to the Kohler Act.
The trial court ruled in favor of the coal company and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, setting the stage for the landmark
decision.
While the case itself involved only one home, 125 it was plainly
treated as more important than that by all concerned. The Supreme
Court noted:
But the case has been treated as one in which the general validity
of the act should be discussed. The Attorney General of the State, the
City of Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests
were allowed to take part in the argument below and have submitted
their contentions here. It seems, therefore, to be our duty to go farther
in the statement of our opinion, in order that it may be known at
once, and that further suits should not be brought in vain. 126

So saying, the Court proceeded to analyze the right of the public
to enact regulations which destroy recognized rights in property in order to accomplish some public good. In language which has been oftquoted, the Court concluded that the Constitution precluded such uncompensated regulation:

The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by eminent domain are those that it has paid for. If in any case its representatives have been so shortsighted as to acquire only surface rights
without the right of support, we see no more authority for supplying
the latter without compensation than there was for taking the right of
way in the first place and refusing to pay for it because the public
wanted it very much. The protection of private property in the Fifth
Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides
that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation.
The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recoglions, 37 ARK. L. REv. 612 (1983).
124. See supra note 3.
125. This fact would be seized upon by the lower courts in Keystone as a means of distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp.
511,516 (W.D. Pa. 1984), affd sub nom. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. Duncan, 771 F.2d
707, 714 (3d Cir. 1985).
126. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (1922).
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nized as a taking. . . . We are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change.
We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we assume
that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of eminent
domain. But the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the
changes desired should fall. So far as private persons or communities
have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the
giving to them greater rights than they bought. 127

2.

Adoption of the new statute

In 1965, forty-three years after the Supreme Court struck down
the Kohler Act, the Pennsylvania legislature decided to try again. The
new statute made its first appearance as House Bill 1915. There appears to have been no legislative hearings before the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives unanimously passed the Bill without debate
in less than two weeks. 128 The Pennsylvania Senate was somewhat
more cautious. Based on a concern (which was contained in an opinion
of the State's Attorney General) that the new law would not pass constitutional muster under Pennsylvania Coal, 128 the Senate adopted
amendments. Chief among the amendments was a provision for compensating coal companies for the taking of their property. 180 When the
House rejected these amendments, 181 the legislative session ended with
no bill being enacted.
Early the next year, a special session of the legislature convened.
The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (the
"Subsidence Act"), with few changes from its earlier version, was enacted without substantial debate. 132 The Subsidence Act prohibits the
127. Id. at 415-16. (Emphasis added.) In light of the clarity of this expression, it is something of a mystery how anyone could classify this discussion as "metaphorical," rather than actual.
Compare supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
128. See Pennsylvania General Assembly Legislative Journal House 1975-76 (HB 1915 introduced Sept. 1, 1965), 1979 (reported from Committee Sept. 1, 1965), 2002 (second reading,
Sept. 8, 1965), 2064-65 (third reading and final passage, Sept. 13, 1965).
129. See Pennsylvania General Assembly Legislative Journal House 2947 (Rep. Dardanell,
Dec. 20, 1965 ); /d. at Senate Special Session 10 (Sen. Stroup, March 2, 1966).
130. I d. at Senate 1473-7 4 (Dec. 13. 1965).
131. /d. at House 2877-78 (Dec. 17, 1965), 2946-53 (Dec. 20, 1965).
132. /d. at House Special Session 8 (Feb. 28, 1966), 29 (HB 13 introduced, referred to
committee, reported out of committee, and first reading, April 12, 1966), 31 (second reading, April
13, 1966), 33-34 (third reading and passage April 18, 1966); /d. at Senate Special Session 43

290

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 1

mining of bituminous coal in a manner which causes damage from subsidence to any of the following types of surface structures in place on
April 27, 1966: ( 1) public buildings or any noncommercial structures
customarily used by the public, such as churches, schools, hospitals, and
utilities; (2) dwellings; and (3) cemeteries. 133 Regulations were later
adopted expanding the protected categories to include:( 1) streams and
impoundments with more than 20 acre feet of water; (2) aquifers; and
(3) coal refuse. 184 In order to prevent subsidence, the statute requires
mine operators to adopt measures to maximize stability and maintain
the value and foreseeable uses of the surface, 1811 including, at a minimum, leaving 50% of the coal in the ground as support. 186
When it enacted this statute, the Pennsylvania legislature was
aware of the Pennsylvania Coal decision. However, the legislature apparently chose not to follow it. Both House and Senate members acknowledged the similarity of the Bituminous Act to the Kohler act and
recognized the fate of the Kohler act. However, the Pennsylvania legislators decided to adopt the new statute, despite its similarity with the
Kohler act. They reasoned that since the membership of the Supreme
Court had changed since Pennsylvania Coal a challenge to the new
statute might produce a different result. 187

3.

Impact of the new statute

It is well known that the coal mining industry in Pennsylvania is
extremely important. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the impact of a statute requiring 50% of the coal beneath dwellings and public buildings to be left in place was substantial.
Because of Pennsylvania's long-standing history of recognizing the
support estate as a separate estate in land, coal mining companies have
(referred to committee, April 18, 1966), 44 (first reading April 18, 1966), 45 (second reading,
April 19, 1966), 47 (third reading April 20, 1966). The statute appears at 52 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 1406.1 et seq.
133. 52 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1406.4 (Purdon 1987).
134. 25 PA. ADMIN. CODE§ 89.143(b) (1985).
135. 52 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.5(e) (Purdon 1966).
136. 25 PA. ADMIN. CoDE § 89.146(b)(3)(i) (1985).
137. See Pennsylvania General Assembly Legislative Journal House 2947 (Rep. Dardanell,
Dec. 20, 1965); id. at Senate 10 (Sen. Weiner). Thus, in what has become a perverse reversal of
the rule of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), regarding the judiciary's role
of determining the Constitutionality of statutes, the Pennsylvania legislature joined the growing
ranks of lawmakers who refuse to consider the Constitutionality of statutes and ordinances placed
before them. The attitude is, "Let's pass it and let the courts decide if it's valid." The success of
this tactic is unfortunate. It will simply encourage legislative bodies to ignore the constitutional
implications of their actions.
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purchased a large number of these estates. 138 In fact, approximately
90% of the coal in western Pennsylvania at issue in Keystone was severed (along with the support estate) between 1890 and 1920. 139 Every
mine operated by the Keystone petitioners had at least one structure
over it which was protected by the statute. 140 The requirement that
50% of the coal be left in place 141 meant that some 27 million tons of
coal owned by the coal companies could not be removed. There was no
compensation provided. 142

4.

The litigation in the lower courts

Five coal mining and operating companies, along with an association of coal mining companies, filed suit in U.S. District Court under
42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that the Subsidence Act was an unconstitutional taking of their property without just compensation and an
unconstitutional impairment of their contracts with surface owners regarding the support estate. 143 They sought an injunction restraining the
enforcement of the statute and a declaration that the statutory scheme
was unconstitutional.
138. See generally Ingram, Regulation of Mine Subsidence - Legal Issues Raised by Government Interoention in Historically Private Arrangements, 5 EASTERN MIN. L. INST. 6.01 et
seq. (1984).
139. Joint Appendix of Petitioner and Respondent at 93-94, Keystone. A typical severance
deed reads as follows:
[The owners] grant, bargain, sell, alien, enfeoff, release, convey and confirm unto [the
buyer: ALL THE COAL of whatever kind lying or being in or upon that certain tract
of land ... described as follows ....
TOGETHER with the right to mine and remove all of said coal, without being
required to provide or leave support for the overlying strata or surface, and without
being liable for any injury to the said overlying land or to the structures thereon, or the
springs or water courses therein or thereon, by reason of the mining and removing of
said coal or other coal on lands adjacent thereto.....
/d. at 99, 101-02.
140. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Keystone. There are 3000 such structures over mines operated
by the Keystone petitioners Uoint Appendix at 36-37, 41-43, Keystone) and 14,000 statewide (id.
at 90, 145).
141. It is irrelevant that the regulation theoretically permits more coal to be mined if the coal
companies can prove to the state authorities that leaving less support will not result in subsidence.
25 PA. ADMIN. CoDE§ 89.146. The parties agreed that no such showing could be made. See Joint
Appendix at 28, 295.
142. Under 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.15, owners of a surface estate which was
undeveloped on April 27, 1966 are not covered by the statute. However, they may compel the coal
companies to sell the support estate. Such a purchase would thereafter render the coal companies
liable for subsidence damage. That feature of the statute is not involved in the Supreme Court
litigation. See Brief for Petitioners at II, n. 17, Keystone.
143. The discussion in this article will focus on the taking issue, rather than the contract
impairment issue.
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The District Court opened its opinion by acknowledging the need
to deal with the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal.
In this case we are faced with a constitutional challenge to another
Pennsylvania statute which seeks to prevent coal mining subsidence
damage. However, the statute here differs from the enactment in
Pennsylvania Coal; the parties are different; and, most importantly,
the passage of time and subsequent decisions require that Pennsylvania Coal be placed in proper perspective. 144

True to this introduction, the court found Pennsylvania Coal not
to be controlling. Its ruling was said to be based on U.S. Supreme
Court decisions after Pennsylvania Coal:
Applying these rules, we conclude that the Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act does not constitute a taking
and is a legitimate exercise of the Commonwealth's police power.
First, the statute and DER regulations do not result in a permanent,
or even temporary, physical occupation of plaintiffs' real property.
Plaintiffs retain title and possession of the mineral and support estates. The restrictions merely deal with plaintiffs' use of their properties to prevent harm to the public generally. Second, the statute and
regulations do not vest in the public generally any right to an easement or other servitude in the mineral or support estates. And third,
the restrictions can be upheld on the basis that the Commonwealth
has determined that the health, safety and general welfare of the public are promoted by restricting such uses of land. 1411

This analysis, while technically correct, is based more on wordplay
than reality. Four arguments challenge the district court's reasoning.
First, the fact that no physical possession was taken should be irrelevant, as should be the fact that the coal companies retained title to and
possession of the coal. 148 The Supreme Court has made it clear that the
absence of physical possession does not mean there is no taking. 147 The
premier text on eminent domain put it thus:
144. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511, 512 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
145. /d. at 518.
146. This precise issue was dealt with in Pennsylvania Coal:
"For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine it." [Citation
omitted.] What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with
profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. (260 U.S. at
414.)
147. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122, n. 25 (1978); Kirby
Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. I, 14 (1984). Scholars at both ends of the spectrum
agree: "What stamps a government action as a taking simpliciter is what it does to the property
rights of each individual who is subject to its actions: nothing more or less is relevant ... " R.
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The modern, prevailing view is that any substantial interference with
private property which destroys or lessens its value (or by which the
owners' right to its use or enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed) is, in fact and in Jaw, a "taking" in the constitutional sense, to the extent of the damages suffered, even though the
title and possession of the owner remains undisturbed. 148

Second, saying that the regulation prevents harm (rather than saying that it provides a public benefit) is mere tautology. It is a conclusion used to justify a result, or decision by label affixation. 149 Depending on one's predilection, either label could be applied to most
regulations. The label answers nothing and no reasons are advanced in
its support.
Third, it is not relevant that the statute grants no specific easement or servitude to the government. This is but another way of stating
the first issue discussed above. There is no need to grant a specific easement if the same effect can be accomplished by a regulatory prohibition. The impact on the property owner is no different. 1110
Finally, to conclude that the just compensation guarantee does not
apply if the government determines that the public health, safety, and
welfare are promoted by the regulation allows the police power to eliminate the just compensation clause. Every police power enactment must
be based on a determination that it will enhance the public health,
safety, and welfare. If it does not, then the enactment is void.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 94 (1986).
Forcing someone to stop doing things with his property-telling him you can keep it,
but you can't use it-is indistinguishable, in ordinary terms, from grabbing it and
handing it over to someone else. Thus, a taking occurs in this ordinary sense when
government controls a person's use of property so tightly that, although some uses remain to the owner, the property's value has been virtually destroyed.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 460 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
148. 2 P. NICHOLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 6.09 at 6-55 (3d rev. ed 1975)
(Footnote omitted). See also Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for
Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2, n. 5 (1970).
149. To be fair, this District Court did not invent the concept. For years, it has seemed
endemic to the field of government regulation. Professor Van Alstyne characterized decisions in
this field as consisting of "conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning and empty rhetoric." Van
Alstyne, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. at 2. Professor Sax called them "a welter of confusing and apparently
incompatible results." Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964). Professor
Dunham, limiting his review to decisions of one court, the U.S. Supreme Court, found a "crazyguilt pattern." Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 63, 63. Professor Kratovil concluded that "the
courts are adrift in a sea of confusion." Kratovil, Eminent Domain and Some Land Use Problems,
34 DE PAUL L. REV. 587, 593, n. 38 (1985).
150. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ.); MacDonald Sommer & Frates
v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2572-2573 (1986) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger,
C.J., and Rehnquist and Powell, JJ.).
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Thus, the end result of the District Court's theory is that no police
power action could ever require compensation. That conclusion is
plainly contrary to numerous statements of the Supreme Court. un Indeed, the same conclusion (i.e., that the regulation is based upon the
public health, safety, and welfare) is also the basis for the exercise of
eminent domain (which includes compensation). The Supreme Court
has held in two recent cases that the scope of the police power and the
concept of public use in eminent domain are "coterminous." 1112 Thus,
the public health, safety, and welfare finding is determinative of nothing: it is a precondition to both uncompensated regulation and compensated taking.
The district court also found support for its conclusion in certain
Supreme Court decisions which equate property ownership with a bundle of sticks, an analogy used by professors teaching property law to
first year law students. 1113 While this mode of analysis is often useful,
the Supreme Court's recent decisions have created some confusion. 1114 In
Andrus. v. Allard 1116 the Court sliced the interests in the bundle a little
too finely. Not content with dealing with the bundle as a whole or
individual sticks in the bundle, the Court, without any clarification,
denied relief because the regulation destroyed only one "strand" in the
bundle. 168 No one really knows what a "strand" is, or how it differs
from a "stick" (the taking of which cannot be done without compensation). Seizing on this term, the district court concluded that the Pennsylvania statute took only a strand from the coal companies' bundle of
rights and thus did not rise to the level of a taking. 167
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
holding, utilizing essentially the same analysis as the lower court had
used. 168 However, on appeal one added piece of analysis appeared. The
appellate court addressed the concept of "reasonable investment-backed
expectations":
With respect to interference with reasonable investment-backed
151. See notes 88-95 supra and accompanying text.
152. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co. 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984).
153. For recent Supreme Court decisions adopting this analogy see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co. 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76 (1982);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); Andrus v. Allard,
444 u.s. 51, 66 (1979).
154. See Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 39, 48-49 (1985).
155. 444 u.s. 51 (1979).
156. Id. at 66.
157. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511,518-19 (W.O. Pa.
1984).
158. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985).
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expectations, the support requirements do not appear to work so substantial an interference as to result in a taking. In Penn Central, the
Court applied this test to the divided property context. It read Mahon
as stating that a statute may "frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations" when it has "nearly the same effect as the complete destruction of rights [a party] had reserved from the owners of the surface land." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127, 98 S.Ct. at 2661. The
Court thus stressed that the coal owners in Mahon had expressly contracted with individual surface owners for the waiver of any claim of
damages due to subsidence. It was reasonable for them to have distinct expectations, grounded upon those waivers, to be free to mine
coal without liability for damage caused to the surface owners' estates.
The Kohler Act thwarted those expectations by shifting the burden
contractually imposed upon the surface owners to the mine operators.
In so doing the Act appeared to affect private interests.
In the present appeal, however, the statute at issue is clearly
designed to serve broad and legitimate public interests. The ownership of the support estate does not afford a mine operator a reasonable expectation to profit at the expense of the public at large, but only
at the expense of the surface owner with whom it contracted. 119

A number of flaws appear in the Third Circuit's analysis. First,
while the court correctly analyzed Pennsylvania Coal in terms of the
effect of the statute on the rights of the regulated property owner, in
dealing with the Subsidence Act it reversed course and analyzed the
new statute in terms of its effect on the public. The latter analysis is
erroneous, because the question whether a taking has occurred is determined by examining the impact of the government's action on the property owner. 160 Moreover, the members of the Court that decided Pennsylvania Coal as well as more recent members of the Court have
interpreted Pennsylvania Coal to mean that the public's interest was
examined and found insufficient to override the fifth amendment. 161
The opinion itself stated: "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
159. /d. at 716. (Emphasis is the court's.)
160. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
As the Court expressed it long ago in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S.
189, 195 (1910), "[T]he question is, What has the owner lost?, not What has the taker gained?"
Recent decisions confirm this focus on the property owner by requiring an analysis of the
owner's reasonable "profit" expectations (Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm. v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 [1985]), and the owner's" 'reasonable return' on its investment" Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at 136.
161. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
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achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change. " 182
Emphasis on public interest relates to a second weakness in the
third circuit's analysis. The public's interest in a regulation tells us
nothing about the property owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations. If that concept means anything, it has to be related to actions of the property owners and government agencies before the enactment of the regulation being litigated. Plainly, the government's intent
in enacting a new statute tells us nothing about the reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the property owners before the statute interdicted them.
Finally, the third circuit's opinion ignores a simple theory of property rights. At the most basic level, when one buys property, it is his to
use or sell. The coal companies bought property from the surface owners. The statute took it from the coal companies without compensation
and gave it back to the surface owners. The words of Pennsylvania
Coal with regard to property rights are as applicable today as they
were in 1922:
We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the conviction
that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we assume that
an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain. But the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the
changes desired should fall. So far as private persons or communities
have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the
giving to them greater rights than they bought. 188

5.

The statute is upheld in a squeaker

On March 9, 1987, the Supreme Court upheld the Pennsylvania
Subsidence Act by a vote of 5-4. 164 Justice Stevens opened his majority
opinion 1611 with the premise that Pennsylvania Coal had been decided
on its "particular facts," and this case must be decided in the same
manner. 168 Early in the substantive part of the opinion, the Court made
162. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416 (Emphasis added.)
163. /d.
164. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9,
1987) (No. 85-1 092).
165. The majority consisted of Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun.
The dissent was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined in by Justices Powell, O'Connor,
and Scalia.
166. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4327. That much was hardly news, as the Court has repeatedly said
that regulatory taking cases always turn on "ad hoc" factual investigations. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005, (1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175
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it clear that it had no intention of overruling Pennsylvania Coal. Indeed, the majority noted that "(t]he two factors that the [Pennsylvania
Coal] Court considered relevant, have become integral parts of our takings analysis." 167
However, it was plain that the majority intended to downplay certain aspects of Pennsylvania Coal. The tension within the majority
opinion is apparent. The opinion's initial focus is on the strict holding
of Pennsylvania Coal, which was only one paragraph long. 168 The remainder of Pennsylvania Coal,-i.e., the part of the opinion which has
been repeatedly cited and quoted in the past six and a half decades-is
termed "advisory." 169 Because of that conspicuous use of the "advisory"
part of the opinion, the major precepts of Pennsylvania Coal-whether
legitimate state interests are substantially advanced and whether the
property owner is denied economically viable use of his land-were analyzed. The majority and dissent clashed on both. 170

a. Legitimate state interests
The first clash was a straightforward factual one: Was the state
interest behind the Kohler Act (struck down in Pennsylvania Coal)
different from the one advanced in the Subsidence Act. The majority,
by viewing the Kohler Act very narrowly, held that there was a difference. The Kohler Act, said the majority, "merely involve[d] a balancing
of the private economic interests of the coal companies against the private interests of the surface owners." 171 With regard to the private
property owners involved in Pennsylvania Coal, the Keystone majority
said "that if the private individuals needed support for their structure,
they should not have take(n] the risk of acquiring only surface
rights.' " 172 By contrast, the majority held that the Subsidence Act was
based on concerns which were far more public in nature. 173
(1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).)
167. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4330. The dissent went further, terming Pennsylvania Coal "the foundation of our regulatory takings jurisprudence" and "a cornerstone of the jurisprudence of the
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause." 55 U.S.L.W. at 4336 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This seemingly minor difference in wording apparently denoted a deep division on the Court
over how much weight to give Pennsylvania Coal.
168. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4330.
169. /d. This apparent lese majeste troubled the dissenters, who "approach[ed] this case with
greater deference to the language as well as the holding of Pennsylvania Coal ... " 55 U.S.L.W.
at 4336 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170. For example, where the majority found that "the Subsidence Act differs from the
Kohler Act in critical and dispositive respects," 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331, the dissenters concluded
"the difference between [the relevant factors here J and those in Pennsylvania Coal verge on the
trivial." 55 U.S.L.W. at 4336 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
171. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4330 (Emphasis added).
172. /d. at 4331.
173. /d. at 4330.

298

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 1

The majority severely understated the similarity of purpose between the Subsidence Act and the Kohler Act. A comparison of the
stated purposes of the two statutes demonstrates that any differences
between the two are trivial.

Kohler Act
"[The statute was enacted] 'as
remedial legislation, designed to
cure existing evils and abuses
... ' [including] 'wrecked and
dangerous streets and highways,
collapsed public buildings,
churches, schools, factories,
streets, and private dwellings,
broken gas, water and sewer
systems, the loss of human life

Subsidence Act
"[T]o aid in the protection of the
safety of the public, to enhance
the value of [surface area] lands
for taxation, to aid in the
preservation of surface water
drainage and public water
supplies and generally to improve
the use and enjoyment of such
lands .... " 1711

!!174

Moreover, as noted above, at the urging of the Pennsylvania Attorney
General (among others), the Court, in Pennsylvania Coal had examined the constitutionality of the Kohler Act as a whole. Its conclusion seems not to have been fairly represented by the Keystone majority.
The complete quote (which the Keystone majority truncated, as noted
above) 178 reads as follows: "So far as private persons or communities
have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot
see that the fact that this risk has become a danger warrants the giving
to them greater rights than they bought." 177 It would seem that the
better reading of the Kohler Act is that the act was designed to address
public problems and that the Supreme Court viewed it that way when
it ruled in Pennsylvania Coal. 178
The next clash between the majority and the dissent was over the
nature of the significant public purpose, and the consequences of that
finding. The majority viewed the public purpose as being the exercise
174. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, 495, 496 118 A. 491, 493 (1922).
(Quoting the statute.)
175. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1406.2 (Purdon 1987).
176. Supra text accompanying note 172.
177. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). (Emphasis added.)
178. Indeed, unless there was some public purpose behind the act, the Court could not have
concluded that "the statute was passed upon the conviction that an exigency existed that would
warrant it, and we assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of eminent
domain." Id. Unless a public purpose is present, there is no justification for "the exercise of
eminent domain."
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of the "public power to abate activity akin to a public nuisance.»~ 79
With that as its premise, the majority invoked the Mugler line of
cases, 180 concluding that the Court has been "hesitan[t] to find a taking
when the state merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to
public nuisances .... " 181
The dissenters were in substantive agreement with the majority on
the underlying law. They acknowledged "that a taking does not occur
where the government exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a
property owner from using his property to injure others ... " 182 Where
the dissent parted company with the majority was over the range of
activities which can be called nuisances. "The ease with which the
Court moves from the recognition of public interests to the assertion
that the activity here regulated is 'akin to a public nuisance' suggests an
exception [for nuisance abatement] far wider than recognized in our
previous cases." 183
But the majority did not rest its decision solely on the nuisance
doctrine; 184 it also focused on the issues of diminution in value and
interference with investment backed expectations. The dissent's primary disagreement with the majority opinion was over the degree of
harm suffered by the property owners as a result of the statutory controls. 186 Thus, we will turn our attention to that issue.

b. Reasonable, investment-backed, profit expectations
The first thing to note (as the majority appropriately did) is the
procedural posture of the case. While the complaint had challenged the
Subsidence Act both on its face and as applied, the trial had dealt only
with the facial challenge. After the district court upheld the statute
against the facial attack, it certified that portion of the judgment for
appeal. Thus, no evidence was presented concerning the actual impact
of the Subsidence Act on the coal companies, and they remain free to
pursue that issue in the lower courts. 188
The major dispute between the majority and the dissent was over
179. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331.
180. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
181. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4332.
182. /d. at 4337 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing the same line of cases).
183. /d.
184. /d. at 4332.
185. /d. at 4338 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
186. /d. at 4332. This was important, if not critical. The Court has, in the last several years,
made clear its disinclination to deal with takings attacks that are purely facial, with no proof of
specific impact. See, e.g., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 55 U.S.L.W. 4366
(U.S. Mar. 24, l987)(No. 85-1200); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct.
2561 (1986); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. &
Reel. Assn. Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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the definition of the "property" alleged to have been taken by the statutory action. The dissent was willing to accept the unique Pennsylvania
rule that the support estate was a separate estate in property/ 87 and
examine the impact of the statute on that estate, while the majority was
not.
This dispute harks back nine years to Penn Central. 188 There,
New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law was the basis for refusing to permit the owner of Grand Central Terminal from constructing
an office tower over the famed railroad station. In rejecting the owner's
claim that it had been subjected to a taking because it was forbidden to
make any use of the air rights on its property, the Court concluded:
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather
both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of
the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole - here, the city
tax block designated as the landmark site. 189

As it would in Keystone, the Penn Central Court concluded
that-on the record then before the Court-there was no taking. 190
The Keystone majority applied Penn Central as written, refusing to
separately examine either the 27 million tons of coal required to be left
in the ground 191 or the support estate. 192 The majority's position with
187. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4339 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This is in keeping with the settled
rule that state law determines what property is. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 467 U.S.
986, 1003 (1984); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
188. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
189. Jd. at 130-31. To have held otherwise (in the context of a facial attack) would have
resulted in a wholesale review of zoning law going back at least as far as Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S.
603 (1927), a case in which building setbacks were approved. In such cases, a part of the property
is plainly forbidden to be used, but no constitutional "taking" occurs.
On the other hand, where local zoning ordinances have zoned different parts of a single
ownership for different uses, courts have examined the impact of regulations on the individuallyzoned segments. See, e.g., American Sav. & Loan Assn. v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th
Cir. 1981); Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 581 P.2d 50 (1978).)
190. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978). If circumstances changed, the property owner was free to return to court. Jd. at 138, n.36.
191. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4334.
192. Some shift in opinion on the Court may be taking place with respect to Penn Central.
Penn Central was a 6-3 decision, with the majority consisting of Justices Brennan, Stewart,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. The dissenters were Justices Rehnquist and Stevens and
Chief Justice Burger. With two retirements intervening (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart), Keystone was decided 5-4, with the majority consisting of Justices Stevens, Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun. The dissenters were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell,
O'Connor, and Scalia. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun remained constant in
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respect to the 27 million tons of unusable coal was tied to the Court's
physical invasion cases:
We do not suggest that the State may physically appropriate relatively small amounts of private property for its own use without paying just compensation. The question here is whether there has been
any taking at all when no coal has been physically appropriated, and
the regulatory program places a burden on the use of only a small
fraction of the property that is subjected to regulation. 193

Thus, because the Subsidence Act was merely a regulation, and
because there was no claim "that the Act [on its face] makes it commercially impracticable for them [the coal companies] to continue mining
their bituminous coal interests ... " 194 the majority concluded that the
inability to mine this 27 million tons was not a taking.
The dissent accused the majority of playing a "label" game. 196
The dissenters opted, instead, for a more pragmatic view of the regulation's impact:
Physical appropriation by the government leaves no doubt that it has
in fact deprived the owner of all uses of the land. Similarly, there is
no need for further analysis where the government by regulation extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable segment of
property, for the effect of this action on the holder of the property is
indistinguishable from the effect of a physical taking. 198

With respect to the separate support estate, the majority joined
with the court of appeals in essentially construing this estate out of
existence. Notwithstanding its concession that Pennsylvania (uniquely
among the states) recognizes the support estate as a separate property
interest/ 97 the majority concluded that "[i]n practical terms, the support estate has value only insofar as it protects or enhances the value of
the estate with which it is associated. Its value is merely a part of the
entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the
the majority, while Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented both times. Justice Powell switched from
the majority in Penn Central to the dissent in Keystone, while Justice Stevens did the opposite.
One of the retired Justices was in the majority and the other in the dissent in Penn Central. Both
of the new Justices dissented in Keystone. What this bodes for the future is open to speculation.
193. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4334, n. 27. This distinction was essential to the holding for, as the
Court had said unmistakably in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S. 419,
438, n. 16 (1982), the question whether a physical occupation "is a taking does not depend on
whether the volume of space ... occupie[d] is bigger than a breadbox."
194. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4333. See also California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 55
U.S.L.W. 4366 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1987)(No. 85-1200).
195. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4338 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
196. /d. at 4339.
197. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4334.
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surface." 198 That definitional conclusion, of course, ended the matter.
For, if the support estate is merely part of the bundle of rights associated with the coal estate, and the part taken can be minimized as being
merely a "strand," then no taking occurs. 199
The dissent would have given credence to Pennsylvania's recognition of a separate support estate. The Subsidence Act places the risk of
subsidence on the coal owner even though he also owns the support
estate. The dissenters would have found that a taking had occurred because "operation of this provision extinguishes the petitioner's interests
in their support estates, making worthless what they purchased as a
separate right under Pennsylvania law." 200

c. Some observations
A survey of the Keystone opinions reveals several important points.
First, the substantive legal discussions in the case were not that divergent and slight shifts in viewpoint could easily have made Keystone a
unanimous decision either way. The only real disputes were over the
degree of "public" interest underlying the statutes at issue in Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone and the level of deference to be accorded the
Pennsylvania support estate. These differences hardly signal a drastic
split on the Court over basic takings doctrine.
A second observation about the Keystone opinion is that it did not
overrule Pennsylvania Coal. Not one of the heavily quoted (and eminently quotable) portions of that opinion was disapproved. Additionally, Keystone reaffirm's the general understanding that a regulation
which deprives a property owner of viable economic use is a taking.
A final point garnered from the Keystone holding is that the day of
the facial challenge is essentially over. The court again noted its preference for dealing with facts which directly affect the property owner.
Thus, except in the rare case in which the regulation plainly leaves no
use and/or the regulators have plainly indicated that no use will be
permitted, it seems prudent to avoid facial challenges in preference to
actual examination of the impact of the regulation on some individual.
Thus, the first of the Court's three major takings decisions was
less than a blockbuster. It made no apparent major changes in the law
and essentially ducked the substantive issue. By remanding the case to
the district court for a trial on the statute as applied the Court confirmed its distaste for facial challenges. And, by reason of its S-4 split,
198. /d. at 4334, 4335.
199. The majority left open to later proof (on a challenge to the statute "as applied") the
injury inflicted because either the percentage of the support estate (as part of the whole) is high, or
because other rights associated with the support estate are of no value. /d.
200. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4340 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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the opinion gave no indication that the Court has clearly and firmly
decided on a regulatory taking policy. The remaining cases may clarify
that issue.

B.

Church v. State

The second case argued this term represents the Court's fifth attempt in the 1980's to find the right case in which to clearly determine
whether just compensation is an appropriate remedy in a regulatory
taking case. 201 In the four earlier cases, the Court felt that it was unable to reach the issue because the procedural posture of each case left
preliminary questions unanswered or because the judgment was not
deemed final.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 202 the uses permitted "on paper"
were facially reasonable and it was not known what would eventually
be permitted. 203 In San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 204
the judgment between the parties was not deemed sufficiently "final"
for Supreme Court review. In Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 20 r, it was not clear what variances
might be granted under local law to make the subdivision viable. Moreover, an existing state inverse condemnation remedy had not been utilized. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 206 it was
not clear whether less intense development might be permitted.
201. The Court has expressly acknowledged "the importance of the question whether a monetary remedy in inverse condemnation is constitutionally required in appropriate cases involving
regulatory takings." MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2565-66
(1986 ). Scholars agree:
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton Bank evidences its desire to avoid
addressing the taking issue squarely. Unfortunately, the Court's erection of procedural
road-blocks hinders the determination of substantive legal issues. Whether the Brennan
formula [in San Diego Gas] is the proper means for determining damages in instances
of governmental takings is a matter of enormous import and should be addressed by the
Court.
Kratovil, Eminent Domain Revisited and Some Land Use Problems, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 587,
600 (1985).
202. 447 u.s. 255 (1980).
203. Seven years later, Mr. and Mrs. Agins are no better off. They filed an amicus curiae
brief in Lutheran Church to vividly illustrate the pragmatic problems facing property owners in
California. Their five acre parcel was zoned to permit from one to five dwellings. Following the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Mr. and Mrs. Agins were given permission to build three homes,
subject to expensive pre-conditions. After spending more than half a million dollars to draw plans
for the houses, obtain the permits, and install improvements to comply with the city's conditions,
the city enacted a moratorium (of indefinite duration) on further construction. Agins Amicus Curiae Brief at 5-6, Lutheran Church. Thus Mr. and Mrs. Agins remain without either use of their
property or compensation.
204. 450 u.s. 621 (1981).
205. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
206. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
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Such non-decisions are unfortunate. They fortify the resolve of
those who would deny the constitutional remedy of just compensation.
Indeed, it is not amiss to say that the average person on the street (not
to mention the average government official) often mistakes a ruling on
procedural grounds for approval of the underlying activity, or views it
as de facto the same in terms of results. The following comments concerning the related field of exclusionary zoning are just as applicable to
regulatory taking cases:
When courts are reluctant to reach the merits of alleged exclusion,
exclusion is thereby encouraged. If an act is challenged unsuccessfully
due to the absence of standing, the general public, and often municipal officials, interpret the outcome as an approval of the act itself.
The subtleties of judicial restraint, of merits not having been reached,
of questions remaining open, are not grasped. More importantly, if
the questioned action really is impermissible, the adverse consequences of exclusion are perpetuated still longer. 207

The nation's need for certainty has become acute. Uniformity of
protection of federal constitutional rights of citizens of all states, as well
as respect for the judicial system's ability to provide equal protection,
are parts of that need. 208 Further delay in deciding the issue will only
increase the number of individuals injured by denial of their constitutional rights.
Into this lion's den, which had already dispatched a bank and a
major public utility, strode the First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale, California ("the church").

1.

The facts

The case involves what at one time was a camp called Lutherglen.
The church had maintained the camp for more than two decades on 21
acres of land in the mountains of the Angeles National Forest north of
the City of Los Angeles. The camp was developed as a place for retreats and for recreation by church members and handicapped children
of all denominations.
In the winter of 1977-78, a forest fire denuded the hills around
Lutherglen. Subsequent extraordinary storms falling on the barren wa207. Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative and judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REv. 29, 70 (1980).
208. In light of the Court's determination that these issues need to be first presented to the
state courts (Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)), it is
imperative that those fifty courts have a clear, uniform standard to apply in the protection of fifth
amendment rights.
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tershed caused a flood which destroyed the camp. 209 After the storms,
the County adopted an ordinance which temporarily prohibited any
construction in the area. 210 Three years later, after study, the prohibition was made permanent. 211
2.

The litigation

The effect of the ordinance was to make Lutherglen part of the
channel which collects mountain runoff and transports the waters to a
down stream County reservoir for storage. The church filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the ordinance prohibited all use of
Lutherglen (even reconstruction of the buildings lost in the flood). The
church sought just compensation for the loss of its property. 212
. The County attacked the regulatory taking allegations of the complaint on only one ground: the California Supreme Court's then-recent
decision in Agins made inverse condemnation a non-available remedy.213 The trial court agreed and struck all references to the ordinance
from the complaint.
On appeal, the church asked the California Court of Appeals to
reverse on the ground that post-Agins decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court 214 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals216 showed that Agins
209. Lutherglen was a victim of what expert witnesses (at the trial of issues not involved in
the Supreme Court appeal) called the "fire-flood phenomenon." Ordinarily (without a fire), rain
falling in a forest is slowed by vegetation. Much of it percolates into the soil. Some is carried away
by streams. However, when a watershed has been burned, there is no vegetation to slow the flow.
Additionally, the intense heat of the fire creates a crust on the ground which prevents percolation
into the soil. Finally, the voluminous ash and partly burned debris from the fire is carried by the
water, increasing the bulk of the flow. As the water gathers speed down naked hillsides, it erodes
the soil and adds to the flow large quantities of suspended soil and rock. Thus, if a heavy rain
follows a forest fire, severe flooding can be expected.
210. Los ANGELES CouNTY ORo. No. 11855.
211. Los ANGELES CoUNTY CoDE § 22.44.220, 22.44.230.
212. In light of California's firm position that just compensation is not an available remedy
for a regulatory taking (Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), affd on
other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)), one might wonder why the complaint was filed in state
court. The answer is simple. The complaint was filed Feb. 21, 1979, three weeks before the
California Supreme Court decided Agins. At that time, the law in California was that a stringent
land use regulation could result in a compensable taking. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976) (disapproved in Agins).
213. As one noted commentator was to conclude, the California Supreme Court has "read
inverse condemnation out of California jurisprudence, as a remedy for disappointed developers in
land use cases." 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 158.12 at 412 (1985).
214. Primarily San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). In
San Diego, four Justices (led by Justice Brennan) dissented from the procedural dismissal, urging
that the Agins rule was incorrect in light of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Justice Rehnquist filed
a concurring opinion, in which he agreed that the case ought to be dismissed, but said that if it
had been procedurally "final," he would have had little difficulty agreeing with the dissent. It took
no more than simple arithmetic to count the votes. For extended discussion, see Bauman, The
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was improper as a matter of federal constitutional law. The court of
appeal, however, affirmed. It held that until the U.S. Supreme Court
expressly overruled the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins,
lower California courts were compelled to follow Agins: "We conclude
that because the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
question of whether a state may constitutionally limit the remedy for a
taking to nonmonetary relief, this court is obligated to follow Agins." 216
The California Supreme Court denied review, declining the church's
plea that it re-examine the constitutionality of Agins in light of more
recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal courts of
appeals. 217 The appeal to the United States Supreme Court followed.
What the issues are in Lutheran Church depends on whose brief
one reads. 218 The church briefed the case narrowly, focusing on the
Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts
the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RuTGERS L. J. 15 (1983), which concludes:
When the best, most liberal Justice of the Burger Court's San Diego panel, joined on
the substantive issue by the Court's most conservative member, derides the California
Supreme Court for its parochial, muddled views on takings, inverse condemnation and
the Constitution, more is at work than a mere dissertation on private property rights.
Id. at 94-95.
For an article viewing Justice Brennan's San Diego dissent with alarm and for one defending
that dissent as a principled analysis of Constitutional law, compare Williams, Smith, Siemon,
Mendelker & Babcock, The White River junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. !93 (1984) with
Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of
Five's" Views on just Compensation for Regulatory Takings of Property, 19 Lov. L.A.L. REV.
685 (1986).
215. Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Aircrash in Bali, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311, n. 7 (9th Cir. 1982).
216. Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix A at A416, First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, No. 85-1199 (U.S. argued Jan. 14, 1987). The issue was
considered so well-settled as a matter of California law that it was discussed only briefly by the
Court of Appeal and the opinion was not deemed important enough to certify for publication. See
Rule 977, Cal. Rules of Ct., under which an opinion which simply reiterates settled law is not to
be published"
217. Because of the five concurring and dissenting votes in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (see supra note 169), seven U.S. Courts of Appeals (the
5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 1 lth, and Federal) as well as the Claims Court, have adopted the reasoning
and analysis of Justice Brennan's San Diego dissent: Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,
791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Bank of America v. Summerland County Water Dist., 767 F.2d
544 (9th Cir. 1985); Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds 473 U.S.
172 (1985); Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.
1984), rev'd on other grounds 473 U.S. 172 (1984); Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist.,
703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983); Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Aircrash
in Bali, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); Fountain v. Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d
1038 (lith Cir. 1982); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981). Hernandez v.
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
218. In each of the five cases dealing with the compensatory remedy, the Court was blessed
with a host of friends offering advice. There were slight variations, but the group in Lutheran
Church is typical. Briefs were filed in support of the church by the California Building Industry
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only issue litigated in the California courts: if there is a regulatory taking, does the Constitution mandate just compensation as a remedy? 219
The County, on the other hand, raised a smorgasbord of issues
designed to convince the court once again not to reach the compensation
issue. Each of these will be briefly discussed. The compensation issue
raised by the church has already received much discussion in the
literature.
The first issue the County raised was that the church's claim was
said not to be ripe. 220 As this was the basis for the Court's failure to
reach the merits in the earlier cases, the presentation of a ripeness argument was not unexpected. Two reasons were advanced: (1) on its
face, the permanent ordinance permits some use; and (2) the church
never applied for any use.
The major difficulty with the County's ripeness issues is that they
were never raised in the state court proceedings. Having been no part
of the lower court deliberations, it is hard to see how they could suddenly make an appearance in the U.S. Supreme Court. 221 Moreover, on
Association, the American College of Real Estate Lawyers, the National Association of Home
Builders, the Pacific Legal Foundation (along with Donald and Bonnie Agins), the California
Association of Realtors, and the National Association of Realtors.
Briefs were filed in support of the County by the United States, a consortium of environmental groups led by the Conservation Foundation, a consortium of groups of governmental agencies
brought together by the State and Local Legal Center, a group of 24 states led by California's
Attorney General, and a group of 16 California cities led by the City of Los Angeles.
219. The Complaint alleged that the ordinance "[D)enies First Church all use of Lutherglen." Joint Appendix of Petitioner and Respondent 12, Lutheran Church. The trial court treated
the ordinance as one which "deprives a person of the total use of his land" (Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix D at A26, Lutheran Church) and dealt only with the question of what remedy
the Constitution requires. The Court of Appeal likewise accepted the complaint's allegation of a
"taking of all use of Lutherglen" and dealt only with the Constitutionality of the non-compensatory remedy required by the California Supreme Court in Agins. /d. at A14-A16.
At the U.S. Supreme Court oral argument, counsel for the County conceded that this was the
only issue litigated and that the County had chosen this battleground:
QUESTION [by Justice White): Why would they go to the trouble of deciding the
remedy issue? "MR. WHITE [counsel for the County]: Why would who go to the
trouble of deciding the remedy issue?
QUESTION [by Justice White): The Court of Appeals.
MR. WHITE: Because that was the only issue in front of them ....
. . . The County filed a motion to strike based on the grounds that the allegations
were irrelevant. They were irrelevant based on the Agins decision, which had been
decided just a matter matter of months before the motion was filed.
The Agins decision said in essence, if you have a regulatory taking claim, the
proper remedy is declaratory relief, not inverse [condemnation].
QUESTION [by Justice White): You led the Court of Appeals into it?
MR. WHITE: We led the Court of Appeals into it .... "
Transcript of oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court at 39-40, Lutheran Church.
220. Brief of Appellee at 18, Lutheran Church.
221. See Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976).
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their face, these arguments are not persuasive. Under the "temporary"
ordinance, which was in effect for three years, no use was permitted. 222
The uses permitted under the permanent ordinance were three in number: accessory buildings, automobile parking facilities, and flood control
structures. 223 But an "accessory" building requires a main building for
it to be an accessory to. 224 If the term were interpreted broadly, the
exception would swallow the general prohibition of structures. As there
were (and could be) no main buildings, there could be no accessories.
Parking facilities are of no use to a property owner who is forbidden to
make other use of his land. Lutherglen is not located in an urban setting, where a parking lot might be a meaningful use by itself. It is
located in a remote mountain area where parking, by itself, is useless.
The same goes for flood control structures. While such structures might
make sense to a government agency, or even a private property owner
with other buildings to protect, the "use" was worthless at Lutherglen.
As for applying for a permit, there was nothing for which to apply. The county had just adopted a building prohibition and had made
it clear to church members that the prohibition would be enforced. 2211
Any application would have been futile. 228
The county's second argument was that, before reaching the compensation issue, the Court had to determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleged a taking, even though the state courts did not reach
that issue. Aside from the elementary proposition that the County's acceptance of the facts in the lower courts (by arguing only the remedy
issue) was a waiver of any factual defect in the allegations, 227 the reaction to this idea by several members of the Court at oral argument
speaks eloquently:
QUESTION [by Chief Justice Rehnquist]:
But doesn't that go beyond the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Mr.
White? I thought that they had assumed for purposes of decision that
there was a taking and they said under California law, even if there
was a taking here, you're not entitled to damages by reason of temporary deprivation. I don't think they really decided the question of
whether there was a taking. They assumed there was one. Now, do
222. Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix Fat A31, Lutheran Church.
223. /d. at A32-A33.
224. Los ANGELES CoUNTY CoDE § 22.08.010.
225. See Appellant's Reply Brief, App. 1-3, Lutheran Church. Moreover, no variance could
have been granted which was not in harmony with the ordinance. See, e.g., Cow Hollow Imp.
Club. v. DiBene, 245 Cal. App. 2d 160, 53 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1966).
226. For a discussion of the futility doctrine, see, e.g., D. KMIEC, ZoNING AND PLANNING
DESKBOOK § 7.01 (1986); 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZoNING AND PLANNING § 35.02 (4th
ed. 1986).
227. Cf Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
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you want us to look into that and say, well, no matter what California law is, we don't think there was a taking here?
MR. WHITE [counsel for the County]: Yes, Your Honor, I do. Let
me explain why.
QUESTION [by Chief Justice Rehnquist]: That's a very strange
procedure.
MR. WHITE: Let me explain QUESTION [by Justice White]: We have to decide, do we want to
avoid one constitutional question in order to get to another . . . [ ?] 228
QUESTION [by Justice Scalia] But that's not part of the case, Mr.
White. I really don't understand this argument.
You want us to review the federal issue that was not decided below in
order not to review the federal issue that was decided below. 229

The County's third argument was that it was only exercising its
police power to regulate a hazardous activity and thus there could be
no compensable taking. 230 This argument was based on the line of cases
headed by Mugler v. Kansas, 231 which was discussed earlier. 232
The County's next argument came as something of a shock to California land use lawyers. Eschewing a host of California cases, the
County argued that "AGINS I does not bar just compensation as a
remedy for a taking .... " 233 That statement would surely come as a
surprise not only to the California Supreme Court, but to all other
California courts which have dealt with this issue. 234 Without benefit of
any citation to Agins or any other authority, the County argued that
228. Transcript of oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court 32-33, Lutheran Church.
229. /d. at 35, 37.
230. Brief for Appellee at 29, Lutheran Church.
231. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
232. Supra notes 75-112 and accompanying text.
233. Brief for Appellee at 38, Lutheran Church. The appellation "Agins I" was used by all
participants to distinguish the Agins decision of the California Supreme Court (Agins I) from that
of the U.S. Supreme court (Agins II).
234. That the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins does bar just compensation as a
remedy for a regulatory taking in California is born out by each of the following cases (in addition, of course, to Lutheran Church): Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 39
Cal. 3d 862, 867, n. 4, 705 P.2d 866 (1985); Furey v. City of Sacramento, 24 Cal. 3d 862, 871,
598 P.2d 844, 849 (1979); Palmer v. City of Ojai, 178 Cal. App. 3d 280, 294-95, 223 Cal. Rptr.
542, 551 (1986); Walter H. Leimer! Co. v. California Coastal Comm., 149 Cal. App. 3d 222,
234, 196 Cal. Rptr. 739, 745-746 (1983); Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138
Cal. App. 3d 484, 492-94, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 194-196 (1982); Taper v. City of Long Beach, 129
Cal. App. 3d 590,611, 181 Cal. Rptr. 169,181 (1982); Gilliland v. County of Los Angeles, 126
Cal. App. 3d 610, 615-16, 179 Cal. Rptr. 73, 77 (1981); Liberty v. California Coastal Comm.,
113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 498, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247, 251 (1980); Rancho La Costa v. County of San
Diego, 111 Cal. App. 3d 54, 65, 168 Cal. Rptr. 491, 497 (1980); Toso v. City of Santa Barbara,
101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 948, 162 Cal.Rptr. 210, 217 (1980); Briggs v. State, 98 Cal. App. 3d 190,
202, 159 Cal. Rptr 390, 396 (1979); Viso v. State, 92 Cal. App. 3d 15, 21, n. 2, 154 Cal. Rptr.
580, 584 (1979).
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Agins' flat prohibition of compensation for a regulatory taking merely
limited the time when compensation is due. 236 According to the County,
Agins establishes "a two-tiered process" in which a property owner
first obtains a declaratory judgment that the regulation is invalid, and
then-if the government decides to keep the regulation anyway-an action for compensation. 236
The County's theory, unsupported by any authority, is clearly unfounded. Agins is what it is. Neither Agins nor any other California
authority permits compensation after an ordinance has been
invalidated. 287
The County's final argument was aimed at the concept of temporary takings. While temporary takings have been part of our legal system for some time, 238 the concept has gained currency due to Justice
Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego.239 Justice Brennan began his dissenting opinion in that case by
noting that a government agency may abandon a condemnation action.240 He saw no reason why a government agency-if it so
chose-could not likewise repeal a regulation which effected a taking. 241 Thus, he concluded:
The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court
finds that a police power regulation has effected a 'taking' the government entity must pay just compensation for the period commencing on
the date the regulation first effected the 'taking' and ending on the
date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the
regulation. 242

This idea has caused consternation in some quarters, 243 and came
235. Brief of Appellee at 39, Lutheran Church.
236. /d.
237. See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 518, 542 P.2d 237, 244, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365, 372 (1975). Federal cases are to the contrary. See infra note 260.
238. There are a host of cases, particularly during World War II, in which the government
condemned property for a temporary period. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338
U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
239. 450 u.s. 621 (1981).
240. E.g., United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26 (1958); Danforth v. United States, 308
u.s. 271, 284 (1939).
241. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
242. ld. at 658. (Footnote omitted.) Of course, if not repealed, the taking is permanent. See
id. at 659-60.
243. See Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984). But see Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation
and the Fifth Amendment: justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15
RUTGERS L. J. 15 (1983); Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River junction Manifesto:
A reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property,
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under direct assault by the County in Lutheran Church. The County
first attacked the entire concept of temporary takings. "The phrase
'temporary taking' is a misnomer; a taking is by definition more than a
temporary loss of use." 244
The concept of a "taking", however, has never been limited to permanent dispossession of property. As Justice Brennan cogently noted,
"[n]othing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that takings' must
be permanent and irrevocable." 2411 He also observed that the Court had
already held temporary takings to be compensable. 246 Professor Tribe
has commented on Justice Brennan's conclusion that the concept of
temporary takings is constitutionally and theoretically sound:
On the merits, justice Brennan concluded quite reasonably that, although nothing in the Compensation Clause empowers a court to
compel the government to exercise its power of eminent domain
where the regulatory 'taking' is temporary and reversible and the government would rather end the 'taking' than purchase the property, the
government must compensate the property owner for whatever taking
occurred between the enactment and the repeal of the offending
regulation. 247

The County's next argument was that a taking cannot occur unless the government intends for there to be a taking. 248 Three responses
can be raised to this argument. First, the Constitution says nothing of
intent. It says only that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. Second, the Supreme Court has long
demonstrated its adherence to the equitable preference for substance
over form. 249 Third, even the California Supreme Court treats "intent"
19 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 685 (1986).
244. Brief of Appellee at 43, Lutheran Church.
245. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
246. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (inverse condemnation); See also
cases cited note 238 supra (direct condemnation).
247. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 385-86, n. 23 (1985). (Emphasis added.) See
also Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1983); SHONKWILER &
MoRGAN, LAND UsE LITIGATION § 1.02 at 24 (1986); WINDFALLS FoR WIPEOUTS: LAND
VALUE CAPTURE AND CoMPENSATION 296-97 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978);
Damich, Does 14= 5? Overregulation and Compensable Taking, 10 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV.
701 (1980); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE
L.J. 385, 507-11 (1977); Wright, Damages or Compensation for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulations, 37 ARK. L. REV. 612 (1983).
248. Brief of Appellee at 43, Lutheran Church.
249. E.g., Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("[T]he Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a state says, or by what it intends,
but by what it does.") (Emphasis in original.); Davis v. Newton Coal Co., 367 U.S. 292, 301
(1925) ("The incantation pronounced at the time is not of controlling importance; our primary
concern is with the accomplishment."); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 166, 177-
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in inverse condemnation cases (based on physical damage) the way that
general tort law does: one is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts. 260
Next, the County argued that a taking does not occur without loss
of all economically viable use. 261 This proposition is somewhat questionable for the following reasons. First, it is clear that the Supreme
Court cases do not all say this. For example, in United States v.
Causby 262 the Court said:
There is no material difference between the supposed case and
the present one, except that here enjoyment and use of the land are
not completely destroyed. But that does not seem to us to be controlling. The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory
site to grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential
section to a wheat field. Some value would remain. But the use of the
airspace immediately above the land would limit the utility of the
land and cause a diminution in its value. 2113

Second, the issue is largely irrelevant. During the period the regulation
is in force, the prohibition is generally absolute. Most of the litigation
in this field involves regulations whose thrust is to convert private property into open space or, in some other way, to preclude development. 211 '
The County next argued that it would be against public policy to
"intimidate" regulators with fears of compensatory liability if their acts
are held to "go too far." 11111 However, as one seasoned observer of land
use litigation aptly noted:
The planner's argument is really no different from President Nixon's
claim of privilege during the Watergate political scandal, or Norman
Mailer's excusing of a murderer because he is a talented writer, or
Congress' exemption of itself in the passage of employee protection
statutes. What marks a democracy is that people and institutions
78 (1871); see also Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d 1493, 1503, n. 25, where the court
described an inverse condemnation as one in which the government "may have stumbled into
exercising [the power of eminent domain] through actions that incidentally result in a taking."
250. E.g., Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 263-64, 398 P.2d 129, 137, 42
Cal. Rptr. 89, 97 (1965) ("[A]ny actual physical injury to real property proximately caused by the
improvement as deliberately designed and constructed is compensable . . . whether foreseeable or
not.")
251. Brief of Appellee at 44, Lutheran Church.
252. 328 u.s. 256 (1946).
253. /d. at 262. (Footnote omitted.)
254. Because of such total prohibitions, many property owners have been driven into foreclosure. See cases cited in Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River junction Manifesto: A
Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property,
19 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 685, 741, n. 255 (1986).
255. Brief of Appellee at 45, Lutheran Church.
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without exception must be accountable for their conscious actions.
The Vietnam and Watergate scandals of the late 1960's and early
1970's, in which the government sought to hide the truth of its actions
and thereby avoid accountability, wrenchingly brought about an informed maturity in America's body politic-an understanding that
government is neither inherently good nor bad but simply there, to be
used or abused by those in authority depending upon the dictates of
their consciences and the powers fashioned by the existing system. In
the liberal democracy, government, which generally acts well and for
the social good, is designed to serve the people, and in turn, must be
answerable for how it serves. It can be no different in the particularized world of land use law. Questions of takings and compensation
remedies require a balancing of public responsibility and individual
rights, tempered by a constitutionally sanctioned sensitivity to what is
just and fair to the community of one. The Constitution was never
meant to make things easy but to make them right. 266
Indeed, if what the regulators are doing is unconstitutional, a little
inhibition might be a good thing. 2117 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court, a
frequent target of such "risk to the fisc" arguments, generally disregards them. 268
Building on its previous argument, the County asserted that
awarding damages for temporary takings would "usurp" the legislative
function. 269 The County's argument is again refuted, this time by the
Arizona Supreme Court which has succinctly held:
No legislative prerogative is usurped by awarding damages for the
time the property was temporarily taken under an invalid zoning ordinance. The regulating body can still weigh all the relevant considerations and determine for itself how best to effectuate its policy in the
future. The same alternatives are open to them after a remedy of invalidation plus temporary damages as exist after invalidation alone.
The legislative body may pay to acquire the land outright, agree to
256. Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L. J. 15, 99 (1983);
see also Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate-Is That the Question? Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 LoY. L.A.L.
REV. 253, 286-87 (1975); cf The Tower Commission Report (1987).
257. There is a growing body of judicial opinion that concern for compensatory consequences
might result in better service from government employees. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661, n. 26 (1981), (Brennan, J., dissenting); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,656 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,691 (1978); Corrigan v. City
of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513, 517-18 (Ariz. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Burrows v.
City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (N.H. 1981).
258. See cases discussed in Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of
Property, 19 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 685, 749-53 (1986).
259. Brief of Appellee at 46, Lutheran Church.

314

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 1

pay the landowner a certain amount in order to continue the regulation, or simply abandon the regulation altogether. 260

In fact, it is invalidation, if anything, which "usurps" legislative
power. If the sole remedy is invalidation, the judiciary assumes the
right on a continuing basis to overrule legislative determinations. It
stifles legislative flexibility.
Moreover, sole reliance on invalidation would disregard the teaching of recent cases such as Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 261 and Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff. 262 In this line of cases, the Court held
that the judicial role in "second guessing the legislature" is extremely
narrow. Providing compensation comports with this rule. It leaves the
regulation intact, thus giving deference to the legislative determination
that the regulation is needed and merely adding a compensatory element when that is deemed to be constitutionally required.
Thus, far from "usurping" the prerogative of the legislature, the
compensation remedy defers to the legislature by upholding the regulation when proper compensation is provided. That leaves legislative bodies a full range of choice, something the invalidation remedy cannot
do.2&s
Finally, the County responded to the suggestion that some government agencies have toyed with property owners by drafting outrageous
regulations in the first place and then, after a court has held the regulations invalid, only slightly changing the regulations when in fact they
warranted more serious revisions. 264 The County argued that basing a
260. Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513, 517 (Ariz. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
577 (1986). See also Comment, ju.(t Compensation or just Invalidation: The Availability of a
Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 711, 728, n.102
(1982). For cases applying a compensatory remedy after invalidating a land use ordinance, see
Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove,
664 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1982); Gordon v. City of Warren,
579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709,
727-28 (D.N.J. 1976); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
986 (1984).
261. 467
262. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
263. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
264. Instances of abuse are reported in R. BABCOCK, THE ZoNING GAME 13 (1966); R.
BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZoNING GAME REVISITED 288 (1985); D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY 71 (1981); WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND
COMPENSATION 293 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978); Bauman, The Supreme Court,

u.s.

Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in
Land Use controls, 15 RuTGERS L. J. 15, 69-70 (1983); Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42 Pus.
AD. REV. 1, 4 (1982); cf Delogu, Local Land use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36
ME. L. REv. 261, 278 (1984); Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End:
Suggestions for Legislative and judicial Responses, 32 Mt:. L. REV. 29, 36 (1980); Kratovil,
Eminent Domain Revisited and Some Land Use Problems, 34 DE PAULL. REv. 587, 591 (1985);
see Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 491, 505
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rule on such "assumed gamesmanship' " would punish the well-intentioned along with the odious. 2611
This argument misses the point. "Punishment" is not involved.
What is sought is compensation for a taking of property. The just compensation clause seeks equity, not sanctions. 266 Indeed, it has long been
held that government, as a creature of the Constitution, is not even
capable of forming the intent to deprive an individual of property without just compensation. 267 That being so, when a taking occurs, compensation follows. The Constitution was designed to protect against all uncompensated takings, not just malicious ones.
This lengthy discussion of the points made by the County of Los
Angeles in the Lutheran Church case and the possible rebuttals to
those arguments point out that a number of different aspects of the
taking issue are potentially present in Lutheran Church. The Court
will soon decide which ones are addressed.

C.

"we shall fight on the beaches"266

Nollan represents the culmination of years of controversy between
property owners and the California Coastal Commission. 269 That
agency, which has regulatory control over California's entire 1000mile-long coastline, has conducted a crusade to create public rights to
use all beaches from Mexico to Oregon, and to accomplish this at no
(1981); Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River junction Manifesto, 9
VT. L. REv. 193, 201, 211, (1984). However, Justice Brennan quoted the advice of a prominent
California City Attorney and author of a land use text that such tactics are perfectly legal. San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655-56, n. 22 (1981).
265. Brief of Appellee at 47, Lutheran Church. Curiously, when Justice O'Connor asked
counsel for the County to comment on the "horror stories" that were being perpetrated on property owners, he responded: "Well, Justice O'Connor, I don't know of any horror stories." (Transcript of oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court 56.)
266. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); Almota Farmers E. & W.
Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 478 (1973); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950); United States v.
Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949); United State v. Willow River Power Co. 324 U.S. 499, 502
(1945); Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 59-4 at 463 (1978); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ''just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181
(1967).
267. See Meigs v. M'Clung's lessee, 9 Cranch (13 U.S.) 11, 18 (1815); United States v.
Certain Property Located in the Borough of Manhattan, 338 F.2d 596, 598 (2d Cir. 1967); cf
Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
268. Churchill, Speech on Dunkirk, House of Commons (June 4, 1940).
269. For a general discussion of related problems similar to Nollan, see R. BABCOCK & C.
SIEMON, THE ZoNING GAME REVISITED 235-54 (1985); Berger, You Can't Win Them All-Or
Can You?, 54 CAL. ST. B. J. 16 (1979); Tabor, The California Coastal Commission and Regulatory Takings, 17 PAc. L. J. 863 (1986); Comment, Public Access and the California Coastal
Commission: A Question of Overreaching, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 395 (1981).
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cost to the taxpayers. To do that, it has invoked the doctrine of "implied" dedication 270 and has additionally conditioned issuance of development permits on express dedication of coastal access or easements. 271
The latter action is the focus of Nollan.

1.

The facts

For some time, Mr. and Mrs. Nollan leased a small bungalow on
a 3,800 square foot beach lot in Ventura County, California and subleased it to others during the summer vacation period. Years of summer
rentals, winter vandals, and coastal weather conditions eventually made
it an eyesore and a nuisance in an otherwise attractive neighborhood of
new, larger homes. The owner of the property agreed to sell it to the
Nollans on condition that they demolish and replace the substandard
residence. The Coastal Commission agreed that the Nollans could have
a permit to demolish and reconstruct on condition that they dedicate a
public use easement over the beach portion (approximately one third of
the area) of their lot.

270. For the author's view of this doctrine, see Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last-At Least
They Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 75 (1971); Berger,
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: A License to Steal?, 49 CAL. ST. B. J. 24 (1974). For the views of
others, see Briscoe & Stevens, Gion After Seven years: Revolution or Evolution? 53 L.A. BAR J.
207 (1977); Gallagher, Jure & Agnew, Implied Dedication: The Imaginary Waves of Cion-Dietz,
5 S.W.U.L. REV. 48 (1973); Note, Implied Dedication in California: A Need for Legislative
Reform, 7 CAL. W. L. REv. 259 (1970); Note, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication
and its Effect on the California Coastline Property Owner: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 4 LoY.
L.A.L. REv. 438 (1971); Comment, Californians Need Beaches-Maybe Yours! 7 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 605 (1970); Comment, Implied Dedication: A Threat to the Owners of California's Shoreline, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 327 (1971); Note, This Land is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied
Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1092 (1971); Note,
Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564 (1970); Comment, Public Or Private Ownership
of Beaches: An Alternative to Implied Dedication, 18 UCLA L. REv. 795 (1971).
271. That government agencies like to characterize these exactions as "donations" or "dedications," voluntarily given as a condition to development approval, should not mask the reality of
the situation. Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CoRN. L. Q. 871,876-81 (1967). "As a practical matter, most developers are forced to
comply with the requirements laid down by local governments because of the prohibitively expensive financing and opportunity costs incurred as a result of protracted delay caused by litigation."
Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 415, 417, n. 9 (1981). Thus, any "donation" is purely fictional. As
the Supreme Court wisely admonished through Justice Holmes, "in States bound together by a
Constitution and subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, great caution should be used not to let
fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact." McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
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The litigation

After the permit was issued, the Nollans sued to invalidate the
condition. The trial court agreed with the Nollans and remanded the
matter to the Coastal Commission for further proceedings. 272 After a
rehearing, 273 the Coastal Commission again issued the permit subject to
a public access condition and the Nollans returned to court. Because no
"new" evidence showed any burden on public access had been created
by the Nollans, the trial court again ruled in their favor, this time ordering that the permit be issued free of the public access condition. 274
However, on appeal the California Court of Appeal reversed. 2 n
To fully appreciate the Nollan decision, it is necessary to discuss
the general federal rule regarding conditions and exactions, the law applied in states other than California in land use cases, and then the
California rule. As is the case with respect to the compensation issue
involved in Lutheran Church, California has charted its own course on
conditions and exactions as well.

3.

The rule in the federal courts

While it has decided no cases dealing with land use exactions, the
Supreme Court is no stranger to governmental attempts to condition the
receipt of some governmental benefit on the surrender of a Constitutional right. In Perry v. Sindermann, 276 the Court held-in no uncertain terms-that the government could not circumvent the Constitution
by imposing conditions:
272. The trial court found that the Nollans were merely replacing one existing dwelling with
another one and that this action was in keeping with the neighborhood. The court also held that
the record failed to show that the new home would have any adverse impact on coastal access. The
court concluded that an access dedication is Constitutional only when the proposed construction
will place a burden on public access and, since none was shown, the action had to be vacated.
Clerk's Transcript on Appeal at 235.
273. The Coastal Commission's staff presented a great deal of additional data at the rehearing. Interestingly, none of the assembled data related to the Nollans or their property. Rather, the
staff compiled general literature dealing with the need for coastal access, studies about Lake
Tahoe (which is nowhere near Ventura County), articles on access problems in other states, and
the like. See Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix E, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 86133 (U.S. argued March 30, 1987). The closest the Coastal Commission got to analyzing the
impact of the Nollans' construction on beach access was to say that building private residences
between the beach and the nearest public highway interferes with the public's view of the beach.
This, the Commission argued, leads people to believe there is no beach, and the construction of
numerous private residences creates a "psychological" barrier to access by leading people to believe
the public has no right to get to the coastline. /d. at E37-E38.
274. /d., Appendix D.
275. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28
(1986), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 312 (1986), dismissal denied, 107 S. Ct. 665 (1986).
276. 408 u.s. 593 (1972).
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For at least a quarter century, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests .... For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected [rights], his exercise of those freedoms would in ef
feet be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to
"produce a result which [it] could not command directly." Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible. 277

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied Perry in the
context of a condition to a land use permit which required "dedication"
of property. In Parks v. Watson, 278 a property owner sought to have a
city vacate "paper" streets279 on its property so apartments could be
built. The city was amenable, but conditioned the "vacation" of the
"paper" streets on the property owners' giving to the city property containing valuable geothermal wells. 280 The court lost little time in concluding that the city's desire to own the geothermal wells did not give it
the right to extort dedication of the wells. Dedication of the wells bore
no rational relationship to the owners' seeking a vacation of the "paper" streets:
Both case authority and scholarly commentary indicate that a condition requiring an applicant for a government benefit to forgo a constitutional right is unlawful if the condition is not rationally related to
the benefit conferred.
Since the requirement that Klamath Valley Company give its geothermal wells to the City had no rational relationship to any public
purpose related to the vacation of the platted streets, the unrelated
purpose does not support the requirement that the company surrender
its property without just compensation .... The condition violates the
fifth amendment.ll 81

A similar situation occurred m Littlefield v. City of Afton. 282
277. /d. at 597. (Emphasis added; citation omitted.) For analyses of earlier decisions, see
Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935);
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
278. 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
279. That is, streets that appeared on the City's general plan for future construction but that
did not exist as traveled ways.
280. These wells produce steam and hot water created by the earth's magma when the
magma is close to the surface. The heat energy is used to produce electrical power.
281. /d. at 652-53.
282. 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986).
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There, the city sought to condition the construction of a single residence
on the property owners' dedication of an easement permitting access to
a neighboring, landlocked parcel, owned by others. Relying, inter alia,
on Perry and Parks, the court concluded that, "appellants stated a substantive due process claim when they alleged that the City acted capriciously and arbitrarily and imposed an unconstitutional condition on
the granting of the permit." 288
The Supreme Court dealt with a related matter (also arising in
California) 60 years ago in Frost v. Railroad Commission. 284 There,
by regulation, California conditioned the issuance of permits to private
truckers to use the highways on agreement by the private carriers to
assume the duties and burdens of public carriers. In holding that the
right to use the highways could not be so conditioned, the Court fashioned a fitting template for Nollan's requirement of a fictional donation
of an easement in exchange for development permission:
Having regard to form alone, the act here is an offer to the private
carrier of a privilege, which the state may grant or deny, upon a condition, which the carrier is free to accept or reject. In reality, the
carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the rock and the
whirlpool,-an option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his
livelihood, or submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden.
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the
citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold
an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a
surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the
state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge
the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny
a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit
to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited;
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which
require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may
compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its
favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United
States may thus be manipulated out of existence. 2811
283. /d. at 607. See also Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir. 1983) (illegal
conditions attached to barbershop permit); Bynam v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204, 210 (E.D. La.
1963) (three judge District Court), affd 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (illegal condition on permit: to use
city auditorium: speakers had to advocate segregation).
284. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
285. /d. at 593-94. (Emphasis added.)
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Thus, the federal constitutional precept is that the government
may not condition the grant of any benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right.

4.

The rules in states other than California

State courts have developed several variants of the test to determine whether an exaction is constitutional. All except California require some rational and substantial nexus between the condition imposed by the government and the need created by the proposed
project. 286
Illinois is perhaps the most vigilant in protecting the rights of the
individual. Its courts will not permit an exaction absent a direct causeand-effect relationship between the action proposed by the property
owner and the exaction demanded by the government:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically
and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather
than reasonable regulation under the police power. 287

The Wisconsin Supreme Court slightly modified the Illinois rule
because of concerns that casting the rule in problematic terms "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the applicant might place so heavy a
286. One commentator concluded an exhaustive examination of state court decisions as
follows:
All these tests, with the possible exception of those used in California, attempt to
examine the needs of the area being subdivided or the burdens it will place on public
facilities and then determine whether the exaction in some way meets the need or offsets the burden. The California court, while parroting constitutionally required reasonableness, states its rule in no-win language and requires the developer to bear the
burden of proving that there is no reasonable relationship between the dedication requirement and health, safety, and general welfare. Note, however, that this test completely ignores the question of confiscation as though it never a rises.
Staples, Exaction-Mandatory Dedications and Payments in Lieu of Dedication, INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING, ZoNING, AND EMINENT DoMAIN III, 119 (S.W. Legal Foundation 1980). (Emphasis
added.)
287. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill.
1961). (Emphasis added.) This approach of strictly protecting individual rights has also been applied in other states. See Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. App.
1972); Schwing v. City of Baton Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1971 ); Baltimore Planning
Comm'n v. Victor Dev. Co., 275 A.2d 478 (Md. 1970); State ex rei. Noland v. St. Louis County,
478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1972); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182
(Mont. 1964); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980); McKain v. City
Plan. Comm'n 270 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio App. 1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264
A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199 (Va. 1975).
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burden of proof on government agencies that no conditions would ever
be valid. The Court therefore placed an interpretive gloss on the phrase
"specifically and uniquely attributable" which protects the individual
but also permits the government to append rationally related
conditions:
In most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to prove
that the land required to be dedicated for a park or school site was to
meet a need solely attributable to the anticipated influx of people into
the community to occupy this particular subdivision. On the other
hand, a municipality might well be able to establish that a group of
subdivisions approved over a period of several years had been responsible for bringing into the community a considerable number of people making it necessary that the land dedications required of subdividers be utilized for school, park, and recreational purposes for the
benefit of such influx. In the absence of contravening evidence this
would establish a reasonable basis for finding that the need for the
acquisition was occasioned by the activity of the subdivider. Possible
contravening evidence would be a showing that the municipality prior
to the opening up of the subdivisions, acquired sufficient lands for
school, park, and recreational purposes to provide for future anticipated needs including such influx, or that the normal growth of the
municipality would have made necessary the acquisition irrespective
of the influx caused by opening up of subdivisions.
There also may be situations, unlike the instant one, where there
is no substantial influx from the outside and the proposed subdivision
only fulfills a purely local need within the community. In those situations it may be more difficult to adduce proof sufficient to sustain a
land-dedication requirement.
We conclude that a required dedication of land for school, park,
or recreational sites as a condition for approval of the subdivision plat
should be upheld as a valid exercise of police power if the evidence
reasonably establishes that the municipality will be required to provide more land for schools, parks, and playgrounds as a result of
approval of the subdivision. 188
More recently, the rule generally being applied in state courts is
that the condition or exaction is valid if it is rationally related to the
applicant's proposed action. "Rationally related" means there must be
288. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447-48 (Wis. 1965). (Emphasis added.) The Wisconsin gloss on the Illinois rule has also been followed by other courts. See,
e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 273 A.2d 880 (Conn. 1970); Jenad, Inc.
v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966); Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257
(Utah 1980).
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so'll.e nexus between the problem caused by the applicant and the quid
demanded by the government. 289
State courts have also recognized a relationship between development exactions and special assessment districts, and have often analyzed
the validity of each by reference to the other. In assessment district
cases, property owners in a specified area are assessed the cost of installing public improvements (e.g., new or improved streets, curbs, gutters, street lights, etc.). The cost is spread among the property owners
according to the benefit they receive from the improvements. But the
constitutional proscription against the uncompensated taking of private
property for public use precludes assessing an owner more than he
benefits: 290

p1 ' quo

In resolving this issue, analogy may be made to the law governing special assessments. The special assessment a town may charge
a landowner for a public improvement which, in part, specially benefits his property can be compared to defendant's subdivision exaction.
To the extent that it applies private property to public use, the special
assessment, like the subdivision exaction is restricted by the principle
of just compensation .... [S]pecial assessments upon property for the
cost of public improvements are in violation of our Constitution if
they are in substantial excess of the [equivalent in special] benefits
289. See Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 626 P.2d 668 (Colo.
1981); Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. App. 1983); Lampton v.
Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. App. 1980); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908 (Md.
1984); Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976); Briar West, Inc. v. City of
Lincoln, 291 N.W.2d 730 (Neb. 1980); J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12
(N.H. 1981); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 245 A.2d 336 (N.J. 1968); Kamhi v.
Planning Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1193 (N.Y. 1983); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680
S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984); Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980); see generally
Bley, Exactions in the 1980s, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 297,
314 (S.W. Legal Foundation 1984); Connors & Meacham, Paying the Piper: What Can Local
Governments Require as a Condition of Development Approval?, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING,
ZoNING AND EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 2 at 2-12, 2-16 (S.W. Legal Foundation 1986); Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9
FLA, ST. U. L. REv. 415,430-33 (1981); Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14
SYRACUSE L. REV. 405, 407 (1963); Staples, Exaction-Mandatory Dedications and Payments
in Lieu of Dedication, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZoNING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN Ill, 120-23
(S.W. Legal Foundation 1980).
290. The U.S. Supreme Court's views on special assessments were emphatically stated by
Justice Harlan in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1898):
But the power of the legislature in these matters is not unlimited. There is a point
beyond which the legislative department, even when exerting the power of taxation,
may not go consistently with the citizen's right of property . . . . [T]he guarantees for
the protection of private property would be seriously impaired if it were established as
a rule of constitutional law, that the imposition by the legislature upon particular private property of the entire cost of a public improvement, irrespective of any peculiar
benefits accruing to the owner from such improvements, could not be questioned by
him in the courts of the country.
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received. These special benefits constitute the just compensation to
which the specially assessed landowner is entitled.
In view of the analogous deprivation of property worked by a
special assessment and a subdivision exaction, it would be plainly unfair to circumvent in the subdivision context the protection guaranteed
by the proportionality required of special assessments. 291
Where no obviously rational relationship exists, exactions have
been denounced in stinging terms. In one case, the court stated:
While in general subdivision regulations are a valid exercise of the
police power, made necessary by the problems subdivisions create-i.e., greater needs for municipal services and facilities-the possibility of arbitrariness and unfairness in their application is nonetheless substantial: A municipality could use dedication regulations to
exact land or fees from a subdivider far out of proportion to the needs
created by his subdivision in order to avoid imposing the burden of
paying for additional services on all citizens via taxation. To tolerate
this situation would be to allow an otherwise acceptable exercise of
police power to become grand theft. 292
Similarly, in a second case, the court held:
Regulation H requires the dedication of seven-and-one-half per cent
of the total land comprising the subdivision without any consideration
of the town's need for the land. Moreover, there is evidence, that was
improperly excluded, which indicates that some developers would be
permitted to pay the town the value of the land in lieu of its dedication. This appears to us to be an out-and-out plan of extortion
whereby developers are required to pay for the privilege of using their
land for valid and reasonable purposes even though it satisfies all
other requirements of the town's zoning and subdivision regulations .
. . . Municipal officials having authority to adopt ordinances and
regulations have a constitutional duty to observe these [constitutional]
protections [of private property rights]. They may not attempt to extort from a citizen a surrender of his right to just compensation for
any part of his property that is taken from him for public use as a
price for permission to exercise his right to put his property to
whatever legitimate use he desires subject only to reasonable
regulation. 298
291. Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204 (N.H. 1977).
(Citations omitted.) See also, Home Builders Association of Central Arizona, Inc. v. Riddel, 510
P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1973); Briar West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 291 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Neb. 1980);
Langridge builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 245 A.2d 336, 337-38 (N.J. 1968); Reps & Smith,
Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405, 407-09 (1963).
292. Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976). (Emphasis added.)
293. J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981). (Emphasis added.) To the same effect is West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 224 A.2d I, 4
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Thus, while there are several variants of the exaction rule in state
courts, all-except California-seek to protect the rights of the individual against overreaching demands of the government by requiring a
rational relationship between the exaction imposed by the government
and the action proposed by the property owner. 294

5. California's rule relegates the protection of federal constitutional
rights to the whim of administrative discretion
The exaction rule now applied in California is exemplified by four
contemporary Coastal Commission cases: Remmenga v. California

Coastal Comm'n, zsrs Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 296
Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 297 and Nollan.
The theory uniting these cases, which places California outside the rule
applied elsewhere, is that, while the California courts generally pay lip
service to the concept that exactions must bear a reasonable relationship
to the permit being sought,298 their actions belie that assertion. These
California cases apply the relationship rule in such an extreme manner
that virtually any governmental desire suffices to supply that relationship. In stark contrast to all of the cases (state and federal) discussed
earlier, California does not require that the action sought by the permit
applicant bear any cause-and-effect relationship to the conditions which
are attached to the permit.ln Remmenga, the property owner sought to
construct one house on a 106 acre parcel. He was required to pay
$5,000 (in lieu of dedicating property for access to the beach) 299 into a
fund to acquire beach access elsewhere. In Grupe, the property owner
sought to build one home on a 15,000 square foot lot. He was required
to dedicate a public access easement over two thirds of his lot. In
Whaler's Village, condominium owners sought to protect their existing
(N.J. 1966).
294. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE
L. J. 385, 481-86 ( 1977).
295. 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1985), app. dismissed 106 S. Ct. 241 (Burger, C. J. and Brennan and Rehnquist, C.J., would have noted probable jurisdiction).
296. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
297. 173 Cal. App. 3d 240,220 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1985), app. dismissed 106 S. Ct. 1962 (1986).
298. Remmenga, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 627; Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 164; Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 259. See the analysis of Mr. Staples quoted above in note 286 regarding
California's "parroting (the language of] constitutionally required reasonableness .... "
In Nollan, the Court of Appeals, perhaps encouraged by the refusal of either the U.S. Supreme Court or the California Supreme Court to intervene in Remmenga, Grupe or Whaler's
Village, dropped even the pretense of lip service. It candidly said that "the Nollans' project has not
created the need for access to the tidelands .... " (177 Cal. App. 3d at 723) and then concluded
that the absence of any direct causal relationship was irrelevant.
299. He could not dedicate property for beach access because the closest part of his 106 acre
parcel was more than a mile inland from the beach.
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homes from an ocean storm that had undermined one and threatened to
destroy others. The condominium owners were required to dedicate to
the state the right for the public to use the condominium's private
beach. In Nollan, the property owners sought to replace a neighborhood eyesore with a large home. To gain permission to reconstruct
their home, the Nollans were required to dedicate a public access easement over one third of their lot.
These four cases contained no evidence that the proposed construction would have any impact on the public's access to the coast. In Nollan, the court was forthright, "the Nollans' project has not created the
need for access to the tidelands .... " 300 In each of the four cases, the
California Court of Appeal acknowledged this non-impact but held it
irrelevant. As the court of appeal stated in Nollan, "a direct burden on
public access need not be demonstrated .... " 301
The California courts' view is that one must examine the construction of a single home (even on a lot already put to residential use for
many years) in the context of the entire 1,000 mile coastline of California. 302 As the Court explained in Remmenga:
A regulatory body may constitutionally require a dedication of property in the interest of the general welfare as a condition of permitting
land development. It does not act in eminent domain when it does
this, and the validity of the dedication requirement is not dependent
on a factual showing that the development has created the need for
it. 808
By definition, a "rational relationship" must have some basis.
Here, the concern is development of the California coastal area in a
way that balances the rights of the owners of coastal property and other
citizens. Before demanding that a particular property owner "donate"
property to the state before being permitted to build on his land, there
should be some rational relationship between the proposed development
and the "donation. " 304
300. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723.
301. /d.
302. Remmenga, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 630 ("[A] link in a chain barring access .... ") (citing
generalized studies of the entire coastal zone); Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 167 ("[O]ne more brick
in the wall ... .");Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 260 (quoting Remmenga); Nollan, 177
Cal. App. 3d at 723 (citing Remmenga and Grupe).
303. Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n., 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 209 Cal. Rptr.
628, 631 (1985). (Emphasis added; citations omitted; quoting with approval from an earlier
Coastal Commission case).
304. Part of the California problem lies in the philosophical belief of the California courts
that property owners have no right to do anything with their land; the ability to use land is seen
as a privilege. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d
678, 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1981); Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d
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A regulatory agency's good intentions are irrelevant to the question whether a rational relationship exists. 306 So is the agency's power
(at least in theory). As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Kaiser Aetna:
In light of its expansive authority under the Commerce Clause,
there is no question but that Congress could assure the public a free
right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina if it so chose. Whether a
statute or regulation that went so far amounted to a "taking," however, is an entirely separate question. 306

Even though providing additional access to California's coast may
be a good thing, it does not mean the state may achieve that goal any
way it wishes. 307 As in Kaiser Aetna, whether the means constitutes a
taking "is an entirely separate question." This question is the one
before the Court in Nollan. For California to answer it constitutionally, there must in fact exist a rational relationship between the proposed use and the imposed exaction.
The only "impediment" to access after construction of the Nollans'
home is the same one which existed before: the land is privately
owned. 308 But the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Pennsylvania
317, 328, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981). This concept seems plainly at odds with the U.S. Supreme
Court's holdings that property owners have the right to make economically viable use of their
land. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 [1980]; Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (majority], 143-44 [dissent] (1978]; Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 174, n. 8 [1979].) As recently noted, "[o]f the aggregate rights associated
with any property interest, the right of use of property is perhaps of the highest order." Dickman
v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984).
305. In a case involving strikingly similar facts, a New York court reached precisely the
opposite result of the California court in Nollan:
[A] condition may be imposed upon property so long as there is a reasonable relationship between the problem sought to be alleviated and the application concerning the
property. In the case at bar, no such relationship exists. As Special Term properly
found, there is currently no lawful, public access to the beach over the petitioner's
property. The proposed subdivision will in no manner alter this state of affairs. While
the problem of diminishing access to the beach is a matter of serious public concern (see
Executive Law, at 912, subd 1), it is not one which can properly be alleviated by
requiring petitioner to dedicate a portion of her property to public use.
Mackall v. White, 85 A.D.2d 696, 445 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. App. 1981); See also East Neck
Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (N.Y. 1969) (demand for dedication of $92,000
worth of beach front as condition for permit to develop remainder of $208,000 tract held confiscatory and invalid).
306. 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979). (Citation omitted.) See also cases cited supra notes 88-95.
307. Thus, while the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the power of Congress to deal
with such diverse, yet substantial, topics as the bankruptcies of northeastern railroads, the registration of pesticides, and the Carter era Iranian hostage crisis, it has firmly expressed the view that
the solution to such problems must conform to the just compensation clause. See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Regional
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 410 U.S. 102 (1974). California's "need" for recreational beach
access can stand on no more compelling footing.
308. Compare Mackall v. White, 445 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. App. 1981), quoted supra note
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Coal that the "impediment" can only be removed by the constitutional
means of purchasing access:
The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by
eminent domain are those that it has paid for. If in any case its representatives have been so shortsighted as to acquire only surface rights,
without the right of support, we see no more authority for supplying
the latter without compensation than there was for taking the right of
way in the first place, and refusing to pay for it because the public
wanted it very much. The protection of private property in the Fifth
Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation. A
similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth
Amendment. When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be
qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature
is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private
property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way
under the Constitution of the United States .
. . . We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change. 309

Because of these actions by the California courts, government entities throughout California have been emboldened to bend their most
creative efforts at imposing conditions only marginally related (if at all)
to the use of property for which the owner seeks a permit. The fundamental relationship between the government's conditions and the applicant's proposed project is that the government wants the property, the
money, or the service and the applicant is a vulnerable and available
target, unable to offer more defense than the proverbial fish in a barret.310 Moreover, cases like Nollan have told governmental entities that
they will not be judicially restrained for their actions. Thus, exacting
property or funds for certain items may now be the price for obtaining
permission to use one's own property, even if the proposed use does not
305.
309. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). (Emphasis added; citation omitted.)
310. His only choices are to comply with the demand or not put his property to use. In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,439, n. 17 (1982), the Supreme
Court dismissed the non-use alternative as constitutionally unacceptable. See also Hall v. City of
Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d I 493, I 500 (9th Cir. I 986).
For other decisions explicitly rejecting the imposition of exactions on a target of opportunity
unrelated to the need sought to be fulfilled by government, see, e.g., Arnett v. City of Mobile, 449
So. 2d 1222 (Ala. 1984); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980); West
Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 224 A.2d I (N.J. 1966).
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create the need for the exacted provision, i.e., child care (San Francisco); public art (San Francisco, Santa Monica, Los Angeles); "amenity space," including promenades, playgrounds, and jogging tracks (Los
Angeles); low income housing (Monterey, Santa Monica, San Francisco, Santa Barbara); public transit (Los Angeles, San Francisco). 311
If the harsh California rule is allowed to stand, it will free government agencies to coerce, from randomly chosen individuals, property or
money as the price of a routine permit. Given Nollan, and the lip service paid to the need for a nexus, any exaction will be sustainable. If
the facts of Nollan can create a "nexus," any facts can. 312
California has allowed its concern for effectuating broad governmental goals to swallow the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
confiscation of individual rights. 313 If the right to use property is subject to governmental whim, then the right has disappeared. As the U.S.
Supreme Court enduringly said more than a century ago:
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and
unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is
after all but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of
311. See SAN FRANCISCO DowNTOWN PLAN (1985); San Francisco OFFICE/HouSING PRoDUCTION PROGRAM (1982); SAN FRANCISCO TRANSIT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT fEE ORDINANCE
(SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE § 38.1 et seq. (1981); Los ANGELES PRELIMINARY TRANSIT
CORRIDOR SPECIFIC PLAN (1984); MONTEREY 0RD. No. 2416 C.S. (1980); SANTA MONICA
GENERAL PLAN: LAND USE AND CIRCULATION ELEMENTS (1984).
312. The Coastal Commission has been so adamant and successful in demanding "donations"
of access before the issuance of any permit, it has become the subject of "black humor" among the
California bar. In a column in the Los Angeles Daily Journal (the daily legal newspaper with the
largest circulation in California), the tongue-in-cheek suggestion was made that the Coastal Commission be given statewide (not just coastal) jurisdiction, in order to give the rest of California the
"benefits" of the Coastal Commission's beach access policy:
Why not extend the Coastal Commission's authority all the way to the eastern
edge of the state?
Consider the possibilities.
Say some homeowner in Barstow [a Mojave desert community more than 100
miles from the coast] wants to add a carport to his residence. The commission could
step in and require public dedication of an easement for a bicycle path to the ocean as a
condition for building permission.
Soon the state would be crisscrossed with paths to the sea for the public to enjoy
and everyone's fitness would be enhanced.
We can't allow selfish property owners to hamper public enjoyment of our natural
resources.
Policzer, "From the Courts," Los Angeles Daily Journal, October 29, 1985, pt. 2, p. 1.
313. Compare Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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the majority, if you choose to call it so, but it is none the less a
despotism. 314

Nollan is an analytical twin of Kaiser Aetna. 3111 There, the Corps
of Engineers sought to compel the owner of a private marina to open
the marina for public use. The U.S. Supreme Court would not permit
it. "(T]he imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will
result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina
. . . . And even if the government physically invades only an easement
in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation." 316
The same is true in Nollan. The result of the Coastal Commission's action will be the physical invasion of the Nollans' lot by strangers. Such random, unwanted, and unpredictable intrusions by unknown numbers of the general public is so significant that the Court
concluded in Kaiser Aetna that, "we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls
within this category of interests that the government cannot take without compensation." 317 The U.S. Supreme Court has routinely noted
that governmental actions resulting in actual physical invasion are relatively simple to analyze from the vantage point of the just compensation
clause: physical invasion is a taking that cannot be accomplished without compensation. 318
314. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 655, 662 (1875).
315. Commentators have noted the similarity between Kaiser Aetna and Coastal Commission
easement exactions. (See, e.g., Tabor, The California Coastal Commission and Regulatory Takings, 17 PAC. L. J. 863, 882-90 [1986 ]; Comment, Public Access and the California Coastal
Commission: A Question of Overreaching, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 395, 401-02, n. 26 [1981].)
316. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180 (1979). (Citations omitted.)
317. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80 (I 979). Three years later, the Court would return to
and strengthen this concept in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.:
Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's property. [P]roperty law has long protected an owner's
expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete dominion
literally adds insult to injury. Furthermore, such an occupation is qualitatively more
severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent,
or nature of the invasion.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982). (Citation omitted.)
The point was again re-emphasized earlier this Term in FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 55
U.S.L. W. 4236, 4238 ( 1987), where the Court characterized a citizen with government permission
to use another citizen's property as "an interloper with a government license."
318. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 180 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. (80
U.S.) 166, 181 (1871); see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1184 (1967); Kratovil, Emi-
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The question whether California's goal to increase coastal access
for the general public is valid is not the only question involved. California is not writing on a clean slate. Among the things already written
are that property may be privately owned and is constitutionally protected. As the Court noted in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkif.f, 819
states are free to engage in land reform, but when private property is
taken in the process for use by others, compensation is mandatory.
This type of case raises two questions: 1) is the governmental objective within the ambit of the police power; and 2) if so, does the proposed solution violate the constitutional rights of some citizens? No
challenge is raised to the first issue. It can be conceded that the general
goal of providing coastal access is legitimate. However, to legally
achieve that goal by exaction there must be a rational relationship between the applicant's action and the government's exaction in order for
the exaction to satisfy the Constitution. Regardless of the propriety of
the governmental goal, the route to its solution must conform to the
Constitution, not circumvent it.

V.

CoNCLUSION

Government agencies focus on what they view as legitimate societal needs. In most cases, the property owners would probably agree that
the governmental goals are legitimate. Thus, the question is not
whether it is good for government to engage in flood control or provide
scenic open space or beach access or protection from land subsidence.
The question is how can government, in our constitutional system, go
about achieving its desire?
The U.S. Supreme Court has often cautioned that the means chosen by government officials to meet perceived public needs must be
carefully scrutinized for constitutional conformity:
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and of
the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
nent Domain Revisited and Some Land Use Problems, 34 DE PAUL L. REv. 587, 602 (1985).
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), in which the Court sanctioned the use
of shopping center property by groups exercising their first amendment right to communicate with
shoppers, is not to the contrary. In Pruneyard, the property owner wanted the general public to
use his land. That is the whole point of a shopping center. Individual homeowners, like the Nollans, do not. As the Court put it this year in FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 55 U.S.L.W. 4236,
4238 (1987), "it is the invitation ... that makes the difference."
319. 467 u.s. 229 (1984).
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concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more than mediocre ones. 320

The Court has an unprecedented opportunity this term to explain Constitutional limits to zealous government officials. Hopefully, it will
make the most of that opportunity.
EPILOGUE
After this article was written, the U.S. Supreme Court decided

Lutheran Church. The decision validates the arguments made in this
article. Indeed, the preceding paragraph foretold quite accurately the
Court's conclusion. As the Court put it:
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to
some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right; many of the provisions of the
Constitution are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is one of them. 321

Each of the following issues has now been definitively dealt with
by the Court:
• The Agins rule is gone. 322
• The term "taking" is no mere metaphor. 323
• The just compensation clause is self-executing. 324
• A valid regulation can require the payment of just compensation
if it takes private property in the process. 3211
320. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). (Footnote omitted.) See also Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). As Justice Brandeis insightfully admonished:
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when government's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479
(1982). (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
321. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, no. 85-1199, slip
op., p. 16 (June 9, 1987).
322. ". . . the California courts have decided the compensation question inconsistently with
the requirements of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 5.
323. See id. at 9-11.
324. /d. at 9-10.
325. " . . . [The Fifth Amendment] Is designed not to limit the governmental interference
with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking." /d. at 9. (Emphasis added; Court's emphasis deleted.)
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• The Constitution requires compensation for all takings, permanent or temporary. 326
Two and a half weeks after Lutheran Church, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Nollan. That decision also validates the arguments made
in this article. In a nutshell, Nollan makes the following points:
• Property owners have a right to build on their property. It is not
a governmentally conferred benefit. 327
• Notwithstanding its label of "dedication," granting a property
interest as a condition to a permit to make economic use of land is not a
"voluntary" act by the property owner. 828
• A legitimate exercise of the police power may still require compensation if it violates the Fifth Amendment. 829
• When improperly used, an exaction is " . . . an out-and-out
plan of extortion." 880
• As in Lutheran Church, the Court was compelled to act because
the Constitutional rule applied in California was an abberation followed nowhere else. 881
The Court made it express that it intended its decision to be taken
seriously by land use planners. Sophistic game playing will not be
tolerated:
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to be more than a
pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, our cases
describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through the
police power as a 'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate State interest. We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective
where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police power objective. 332

326. /d. at 12-14.
327. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 86-133, slip op., p. 8, n. 2 Uune 26, 1987).
328. Ibid.
329. A permit may be denied " . . . unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the
[owner's] use of their property as to constitute a taking." /d. at 9-10.
330. /d. at II. (The Court quoted with approval from the New Hampshire case quoted
supra at text accompanying note 293.)
331. Slip op., p. 13. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 286-94. Citing all of
those cases, the Court stated that, "[o]ur conclusion on this point is consistent with the approach
taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception of the California
state courts." (Slip op., p. 13.) In further support, the Court cited the Amicus Curiae Brief written
by the author of this article. (/d. at 14.)
332. /d. at 15.
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Good intentions and worthwhile public plans cannot override the
Fifth Amendment:
California is free to advance its 'comprehensive program' [of beach
access] if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this
'public purpose," . . . ; but if it wants an easement across [private]
property, it must pay for it. 333

Eminent domain lawyers will not be without questions to continue
their employment. 334 However, after all these years, it is a fitting memorial to the Constitution's bicentennial to have the Court reaffirm
that we have a government of limited power, and that the rights of
individuals are protected from over-zealous exercises of governmental
power.

333. /d. at 15-16.
334. See, e.g., note 8 supra.

